Does legal enforcement affect financial transactions? The contractual channel in private equity

Quarterly Journal of Economics

Volumn 120, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 223-246

  Lerner, Josh ^a   Schoar, Antoinette ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 15544376362     PISSN: 00335533     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/0033553053327443     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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