The distributive effects of institutional quality when government stability is endogenous

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 409-421

  Carmignani, Fabrizio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND   (Australia)

Author keywords

Income distribution; Institutional quality; Panel data models; Political stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 69549097644     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.03.003     Document Type: Article

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