New evidence on the politics and economics of multiparty cabinets duration

Scottish Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 249-279

  Carmignani, Fabrizio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MILANO BICOCCA   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL ECONOMY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0013128957     PISSN: 00369292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9485.00231     Document Type: Article

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