Why do corrupt governments maintain public support?

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 40, Issue 8, 2007, Pages 949-970

  Manzetti, Luigi ^a   Wilson, Carole J ^b  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Accountability; Clientelism; Corruption; Patronage; Reform

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547266386     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: 15523829     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0010414005285759     Document Type: Article

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