Private antitrust enforcement in the presence of pre-trial bargaining

Journal of Industrial Economics

Volumn 57, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 372-409

  Bourjade, Sylvain ^a   Rey, Patrick ^b   Seabright, Paul ^b  

^a TOULOUSE BUSINESS SCHOOL   (France)

^b TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 69549090107     PISSN: 00221821     EISSN: 14676451     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00383.x     Document Type: Article

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