A model of welfare-reducing settlement

Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 381-402

  Wickelgren, Abraham L ^a  

^a FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION   (United States)

Author keywords

Litigation; Settlement

Indexed keywords

EID: 13444274779     PISSN: 15380645     EISSN: 15380645     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1538-0645.1202     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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