Private v. public antitrust enforcement: A strategic analysis

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 92, Issue 10-11, 2008, Pages 1863-1875

  McAfee, R Preston ^a   Mialon, Hugo M ^b   Mialon, Sue H ^b  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Antitrust laws; D82; Free riding; H11; H41; Information revelation; K21; L44; Private and public enforcement; Social welfare; Strategic abuse

Indexed keywords

EID: 53549131978     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.04.005     Document Type: Article

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