Antitrust policy and price collusion: Public agencies vs delegation

Recherches Economiques de Louvain

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 127-151

  Martini, Gianmaria ^a   Rovesti, Cinzia ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BERGAMO   (Italy)

^b Autorità Garante delia Concorrenza e del Mercato   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 68849127000     PISSN: 07704518     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3917/rel.702.0127     Document Type: Article

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