Alliances in a unipolar world

World Politics

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 86-120

  Walt, Stephen M ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT; POLITICS;

EID: 69249151341     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0043887109000045     Document Type: Article

References (162)

1. George Modelski regards alliance as "one of the dozen or so key terms in international politics," and Hans Morgenthau refers to alliances as a "necessary function of the balance of power operating in a multi-state system." See Modelski, "The Study of Alliances: A Review," JournalofConflict Resolution 7 (April. 1963);
2. and Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," in Arnold Wolfers, ed., Alliance Policy and the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959).
3. The most comprehensive analysis of the effects of system structure on alliance politics is Glenn W. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). Snyder analyzes both, multipolar and bipolar systems but does not address unipolarity.
4. On the core elements of the realist tradition, see Stephen M. Walt, "The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition," in Ira Katznelson and. Helen Milner, eds., Political Science: State of the Discipline III (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005).
5. On realism's ability to account for the end of the cold war, see William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security 19 (Winter 1994-95).
6. The most sophisticated theoretical, statement is William. C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security 24 (Summer 1999).
7. Other useful analyses include G.John Ikenberry, ed., American Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2001);
8. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno, Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999);
9. David Malone and. Yuen Foong Khong, eds., Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International Perspectives (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003);
10. st Century (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004).
11. Works anticipating NATO's gradual, decline include Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, paperback edition, 1990), preface;
12. and idem., "The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America Are Drifting Apart," National Interest, no. 54 (Winter 1998-99).
13. Predictions of imminent balancing against the United States include Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International. Politics," International Security 18 (Fall 1993);
14. and Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security 17 (Spring 1993).
15. See especially Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," National Interest, no. 70 (Winter 2002-3), esp. 8-9. This view is also implicit in Wohlforth (fn. 5);
16. and documented in idem, "Revisiting Balance of Power Theory in Central Eurasia," in Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann (fn. 5).
17. See Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W. W. Norton, 2005), 187-91.
18. Useful but dated surveys of the alliance literature include Michael Don Ward, "Research Gaps in Alliance Dynamics," Monograph Series in World Affairs 19 (1982);
19. Stephen M. Walt, "Multilateral Collective Security Arrangements," in Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, and. Ted Greenwood, eds., Security Studies for the 1990s (Washington, D.C: Brassey's, 1993);
20. idem, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival 39 (Spring 1997).
21. See Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1987).
22. Discussions of bandwagoning include Walt (fn. 10); Deborah Larson, "Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?" in Jack L. Snyder and Robert Jervis, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Superpower Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991);
23. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001);
24. Robert Kaufman, "To Balance or Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies 1, no. 3 (1992);
25. and. Randall K. Schwelier, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19 (Summer 1994).
26. See Steven David, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991).
27. See Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 230-31.
28. Robert Osgood argues that "next to accretion [of power], the most prominent function of alliances has been to restrain and control allies." See Osgood, Alliances in American Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 22;
29. also Patricia Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004);
30. Chris Gelpi, "Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control or Restraint," in Helga Haftendorn, Robert Keohane, and Celeste Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999);
31. and. Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2008).
32. Mancur Olson and Richard. Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics 48 (August 1966). A useful survey of subsequent work, in this area is Todd Sandler
33. and Keith Hartley, "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action," journal of Economic Literature 39 (September 2001).
34. Glenn Snyder and Kenneth Waltz argue that these twin dangers are more worrisome in multipolar systems than in bipolar systems, and Thomas Christensen and. Jack Snyder suggest that these problems are even more pronounced when conquest is easy and the need for prompt and reliable allies is especially great. See Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics, World Politics 36 (July 1984);
35. idem. (fn. 2);
36. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 170-73;
37. and Christensen and. Snyder, "Chain Gangs and. Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity, International Organization 44 (Spring 1990).
38. See Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander (fn. 13); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies: The European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997);
39. Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," International Organization 50 (Summer 1996);
40. and G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
41. See John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security 19 (Winter 1994-95): and Pressman (fn. 13).
42. On process tracing, see especially Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science (Cambridge: MIT Press/BCSIA Studies in International Security, 2005);
43. Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1997);
44. and Henry E. Brady and. David Collier, eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Methods, Shared Standards (New York: Rowman and Littlefeld, 2004).
45. See William Wohlforth, "U.S. Strategy in a Unipolar World," in Ikenberry (fn. 5), 103-4.
46. As Lieber and Alexander emphasize, Europe has sufficient population and economic strength to pose a significant counterweight to American power, were its members willing to invest the necessary resources towards this common goal. See Keir Lieber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back," International Security 30 (Summer 2005), 116-19.
47. See "Worldwide Military Expenditures, globalsecurity.org, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/world/spending.htm (accessed. January 3,2008).
48. See Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony," International Security 28 (Summer 2003).
49. The United States spent 9.3 percent of GDP on defense in 1960, 8.1 percent in 1970, and 5.2 percent in 1990. By contrast, it spent only 3.7 percent of GDP on defense in 2005; the source is "Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940-2009," Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005 (Washington, 2004), table 3.1, at www .whitehouse.gov/o.mb/budget/fy2005/pdf/hist.pdf (accessed June 27, 2006).
50. Summaries of the U.S. position include the introduction, in this issue; Stephen G. Brooks and William Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations andthe Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008);
51. Wohlforth (fn. 5);
52. Walt (fn. 8);
53. and Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Cannot Go It Alone (New York: Oxford. University Press, 2001). American primacy is also acknowledged by quasi Marxists such as Perry Anderson, who writes: "With still the world's largest economy, financial markets, reserve currency, armed forces, global bases, culture industry and international language, the US combines assets that no other state can begin to match."
54. See Anderson, "Jottings on the Conjuncture," New Left Review 48 (November-December 2007).
55. Emphasizing and exploring the value of the go-it-alone option is Lloyd Gruber, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
56. See Snyder (fn. 2).
57. Interview with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Der Spiegel, October 31, 2005;
58. and also the preface to The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C: The White House, September 2002).
59. This issue is explored at length in Walt (fn. 8), chap. 2.
60. In the 1990s French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine repeatedly complained about American "hyperpower" and once declared that "the entire foreign policy of France ... is aimed at making the world of tomorrow composed, of several, poles, not just one," and. German chancellor Gerhard Schroder warned that the danger of American "unilateralism" was "undeniable." See Craig R. Whitney, "NATO at 50: With Nations at Odds, Is It a Misalliance," New York Times, February 15,1999;
61. "Russia's National Security Concept," Arms Control Today 30, no. 1 (2000), 15;
62. Eric Eckholm, "China Says U.S. Missile Shield Could Force a Nuclear Buildup," New York Times, May 11,2000, Al, A16;
63. and Timothy Garton Ash, "The Peril of Too Much Power," New York Times, April 9, 2002.
64. Similar statements acknowledging the resentment and concern generated by U.S. power include The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, March 2005), 5;
65. Max Boot, "Resentment: It Comes with the Territory," Washington Post, March 3, 2003;
66. and William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "The Present Danger," National Interest, no. 59 (Spring 2000).
67. This conclusion would not follow if the United States faced potential peer competitors in the Western Hemisphere. Security competition between the United. States and any serious hemispheric rivals would be intense, and would undoubtedly include efforts by both, sides to recruit allies to their cause from around the world, just as the Confederacy tried to obtain allied support from Britain during the American Civil War.
68. 31As Wohlforth points out, geography and power reinforce each other in the present global context. If any Eurasian power tries to balance the United States by mobilizing its internal, capabilities, this action will alarm its neighbors and encourage them to seek help from the United States. Even a concerted effort by several Eurasian powers to increase their own strength and ally more closely together might be self-defeating if it encouraged others to shift toward the United. States. See Wohlforth (fn. 19), 107-8.
69. On this pattern, see Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship since the June War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977);
70. Warren Bass, Support Any Friend: Kennedy's Middle East Policy and the Making of the U. S Israeli Alliance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), chap. 3;
71. and.Walt (fn. 10), chap.'S.
72. Afghan president Hamid Karzai has also been able to extract various concessions from the United States, largely by threatening to collapse and thereby re-create a safe haven for the Taliban and possibly a resurgent al-Qaeda.
73. See Dana Dillon and John J. Tkacic, Jr., "China's Quest for Asia," Policy Review 134 (DecemberJanuary 2005-6);
74. and Bruce Vaughn and Wayne Morrison, China-Southeast Asia Relations: Trends Issues, and Implications for the United States (Washington, D.C.: Congressional. Research. Service, April 2006).
75. See Stephen M. Walt, "American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls," Naval War College Review 55, no. 2 (Spring 2002).
76. See especially Barry R Posen, "A Strategy of Restraint, "American Interest 3, no. 2 (NovemberDecember 2007). For similar arguments, see Walt (fn. 8), chap. 5;
77. Mearsheimer (fn. 11), chap. 10;
78. and Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment," International Security 31 (Fall 2006).
79. See Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," International Security 25 (Summer 2000);
80. Layne (fh. 6);
81. and Charles A. Kupchan, "Life after Pax Americana," World Policy journal 16 (Fall 1999).
82. 38In their critique of the concept of soft balancing, Wohlforth and Brooks suggest that balancing should be confined to "action taken to check a potential hegemon" and that "balance of power theory is not relevant to state behavior unrelated to systemic concentrations of power." See Stephen G. Brooks and William Wohlforth, "Hard. Times for Soft Balancing," International Security 30 (Summer 2005), 78. Yet this formulation would eliminate any alignments that were not counterhegemonic but still entailed two or more states agreeing to combine their capabilities in ways that would enhance their security, including their security vis-à-vis the unipole. This conception would also eliminate alliances formed when there was no potential, hegemon in sight, but when states nonetheless faced, security problems that they wished to address by joining forces with others.
83. As Iranian reformist politician Mostafa Tajazadeh observed just before the war in Iraq: "It is basically a matter of equilibrium. If I don't have a nuclear bomb, I don't have security." Quoted in Ray Takeyh, "Iran's Nuclear Calculations," World Policy Journal 20 (Summer 2003), 24.
84. Thus, Gordon Corera argues that a primary motivation for Pakistan's clandestine nuclear exports was the belief that it was in "Pakistan's national interest for more countries to have bombs, thereby ... reducing the power of the United States." General Mirza Azlam Beg, former chief of staff of the Pakistani Army, reportedly believed that the global spread of nuclear weapons would hasten the arrival, of a multipolar world and facilitate the formation of an alliance of "strategic defiance" linking Iran, Pakistan, and China. Similarly, Khan himself argued that his efforts had "disturbed all their [U.S.] strategic plans, the balance of power and blackmailing potential in this part of the world." See Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A. Q. Khan Network (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 74-76;
85. and. Matthew Kroenig, "The Enemy of My Enemy Is My Customer: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2007).
86. For competing perspectives on the purposes of China's buildup, see Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security," International Security 25 (Spring 2001);
87. Brooks and Wohlforth (fn. 38), 87; Lieber and Alexander (fn. 20);
88. Robert J. Art, Stephen Brooks, William Wohlforth, Keir Lieber, and Gerard Alexander, "Correspondence: Striking the Balance," International Security 30 (Winter 2005-6).
89. See Michael Slackman, "Wary of U.S, Syria and Iran Strengthen Ties," New York Times, June 25,2006.
90. As a Pentagon spokesman put it: "These are two countries, both subject to attack by forces within NATO. They both have primarily Soviet-built or purchased air-defense systems, and they are both subject to international, embargoes. So they obviously might look for ways to work together." See Philip Shenon, "Crisis in the Balkans: the Iraqi Connection," New York Times, April 1, 1999, Al6.
91. See also "Shanghai Cooperation Organization," at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/sco.htm; and. "Declaration on Establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization" (2001), at www.sectsco .org/html/00088.html
92. See Stephen M. Walt, "Keeping the World. 'Off-Balance': Self-Restraint and. U.S. Foreign Policy," in Ikenberry (fn. 5);
93. also Brooks and Wohlforth (fn. 38);
94. and. Lieber and. Alexander (fn. 20).
95. Analyses of soft balancing include Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," International Security 30 (Summer 2005);
96. T V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in an Age of U.S. Primacy," International Security 30 (Summer 2005);
97. Walt (fn. 8);Jeremy Pressman, "If Not Balancing, What?" Discussion Paper 2004-02 (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 2004);
98. and. Kai He and Huiyun Feng, "If Not Soft Balancing, Then What? Reconsidering Soft Balancing and. U.S. Policy toward. China," Security Studies 17 (April-June 2008). Dissenting views are found in Brooks and Wohlforth (fn. 38);
99. and Lieber and Alexander (fn. 20).
100. See Brooks and Wohlforth (fn. 38);
101. and Art et al. (fn. 41), 190.
102. He and Feng (fn. 45) contains a useful counter to the critiques of "soft balancing" offered, by Wohlforth, Brooks, Lieber, and Alexander (pp. 365-70).
103. 48As a former U.S. official, Stephen Sestanovich, later commented: "The anti-American stance is a familiar French thing. . . . After they'd been French for awhile, they'd stop being French. People thought they understood the limits of the game and it would be over at a certain point. And then it wasn't. And it turned out that the Russians were prepared to be French, as long as the French were being French."Quoted, in Nicholas Lemann, "How It Came to War," New Yorker, March 31, 2003, emphasis added.
104. See Richard Bernstein, "Poland Upstages, and Irks, European Powerhouses," New York Times, May 13, 2003;
105. and Ian Fisher, "Romania, Wooed by U.S., Looks to a Big NATO Role," New York Times, October 23, 2002.
106. This is a central, theme in Kroenig (fh. 40).
107. Of course, having persuaded the United States to try negotiations without success (so far), the EU3 may be unable to convincingly oppose a subsequent U.S. decision to use force.
108. For abrief summary, see Paul. Kerr, "U.S. Offers Iran Direct Talks," Arms Control Today 36 (June 2006);
109. and Matt Dupuis, "U.S. Shifts Policy on Iran," Arms Control Today 36 (April 2006).
110. See Layne (fn. 36), 29-30.
111. Although some of these scholars use the language of balancing, leash-slipping should be seen as a distinct alternative to either soft or hard balancing. See in particular Seth G. Jones, The Rise of Europe: Great Power Politics and Security Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006);
112. Layne (fn. 36), 34-36;
113. Barry R. Posen, "ESDP and the Structure of World Power," International Spectator 39 (January 2004), 5-17;
114. Robert J. Art, "Europe Hedges Its Security Bets," in Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann (fn. 5), 179-213;
115. and. idem, "Correspondence: Striking the Balance" (fn. 41).
116. Posen (fn. 54), 8-9.
117. For a detailed argument suggesting that ESDP is not an example of soft balancing but rather is an attempt to develop complementary capabilities within a complex institutional context, see Jolyon Howorth and. Anand Menon, "Complexity and. International. Institutions: Why the European Union Isn't Balancing the United States" (Paper presented, at the annual, meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1-4, 2007).
118. For detailed discussions of bandwagoning behavior, see Walt (fn. 10), chaps. 2,5;
119. and Mearsheimer (fn. 11), 162-64. A slightly different conception can be found in Randall K. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security 19 (Summer 1994).
120. See Wohlforth (fn. 5), where he suggests that today's "second tier states" (all major powers save the United States) "face structural incentives similar to lesser states in a region dominated by one power, such as North America" (p. 25). In other words, these states are likely to bandwagon in unpolarity, just as Canada and. Mexico have done in the Western hemisphere.
121. Some two years before the invasion of Iraq, neoconservative Richard Perle predicted that a successful war would cause other states in the Middle East to cave in to U.S. demands. As he put it in 2001 : "After we've destroyed the last remnants of the Taliban in Afghanistan ... and we then go on to destroy the regime of Saddam Hussein ... I think we would have an impressive case to make to the Syrians, the Somalis and others. We could deliver a short message, a two-word message: You're next. You're next unless you stop the practice of supporting terrorism.'. .. I think there's a reasonable prospect that. .. they will decide to get out of the terrorist business." See Richard. Perle, "Should Iraq Be Next?" San Diego Union-Tribune, December 16, 2001.
122. The Wall Street Journal 'invoked the same logic after Baghdad fell; see "Those Dictator Dominos," Wall Street Journal, April 15,2003.
123. Syria did not abandon its claims to the Golan Heights, North Korea did not become more forthcoming in the multiparty negotiations over its nuclear program, and Iran has remained, defiant with regard to its own nuclear development efforts as well. Iran did make an indirect offer to negotiate with the United States in the immediate aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, but the overture was rejected by the Bush administration and led nowhere. See Seymour Hersh, "The Syrian Bet," New Yorker, July 28,2003;
124. Gary Samore, "The Korean Nuclear Crisis," Survival 45 (Spring 2003);
125. Gareth Porter, "Burnt Offering," American Prospect, May 21, 2006;
126. Flynt Leverett, Dealing with Tehran: Assessing U.S. Diplomatic Options with Iran (Washington, D.C: New America Foundation, 2006), 12-13;
127. and Karnal Nazer Yasin, "U.S. Hard-line Policies Helped Bring about Reformists' Demise in Iran," Eurasia Insight, March 8,2004, at www.eurasianet.org.
128. See Ronald Bruce St. John, "Libya Is Not Iraq: Preemptive Strikes, WMD, and Diplomacy, Middle East Journal 58 (Summer 2004);
129. Flynt Leverett, "Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb," New York Times, January 23,2004;
130. and Martin Indyk, "The Iraq War Did Not Force Gadaffi's Hand, Financial Times, March 9,2004.
131. Libyans clearly saw long-term benefits to associating with the West. As Gaddafi's son put it: "If you have the backing of the West and the United States, you will be able to achieve in a few years what you could not achieve in 50." See "Qadhafi's Son Says Libya Was Promised Economic, Military Gains for WMD Disarmament," Global Security Newswire, N
132. uclear Threat Initiative, March 10, 2004, at www.nti.org/d-newsire/ issues/2004-3-10.html (accessed on September 12, 2008). According to a comprehensive study by Wyn Q Bowen: "The decision to disarm was the result of the Gaddafi regime's decade-long quest to end the UN and American embargoes imposed on Libya as a result of its past terrorist related activities.... [T]he Iraq war in 2003 and the interception of nuclear technology en route to Libya later that year were not principal driving factors in the decision to forego WMD. Nevertheless, both appeared to increase the pressure on the Gadhafi regime and in doing so may have cemented the decision that had already been taken on WMD, and possibly accelerated the process." See Bowen, "Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back from the Brink," Adelphi Paper 380 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2006).
133. See the superb analysis in Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, "Who 'Won' Libya?: The Force-Diplomacy Debate and. Its Implications for Theory and. Policy," International Security 30 (Winter 2005-6), esp. 72-75.
134. See Walt (fn. 10), chap. 8.
135. See Robert J. Art, "Why Europe Needs the United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly 111 (Spring 1996);
136. and Christoph Bertram., Europe in the Balance: Securing the Peace Won in the Cold War (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International. Peace, 1996).
137. Quoted in Richard Bernstein, "Poland Upstages, and Irks, European Powerhouses," New York Times, May 13, 2003; and "The U.S. and Its Leader Are Popular with Poles," New York Times, June 16,2001, A6.
138. Lee also said: "If the Americans are not around, [the Japanese] cannot be sure who will protect their oil tankers. So they have to do something themselves. That will trigger the Koreans, who fear the Japanese, then the Chinese. Will India then come down to our seas with two aircraft carriers?" To avoid a regional, competition, Lee wanted to "stick with what has worked so far"-the U.S. military presence-which he regarded as "essential for the continuation of international, law and order in East Asia." Quoted in Yuen Foon Khong, "Coping with Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Institutions and Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia's Post-Cold War Strategy," in Allen Carlson, Peter Katzenstein, and. J. J. Suh, eds., Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
139. Quoted in Amitav Acharya, "Containment, Engagement, or Counter-dominance? Malaysia's Response to the Rise of China," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), 140.
140. See Jane Perlez, "U.S. Competes with China for Vietnam's Allegiance," New York Times, June 19, 2006, A3.
141. See R. Nicholas Burns, "America's Strategic Opportunity with India," Foreign Affairs 86 (November-December 2007);
142. and. C. Raja Mohan, "India and the Balance of Power," Foreign Affairs 85 (May-June 2006).
143. Walker adds: "This [trend] started some time ago and Qatar led the way.... It capitalized on this to set up a counterforce with other small countries because everyone had suffered under the shadow of the big boys." Saudi political analyst Jamal Khashoggi adds: "They're all trying to score points with
144. the U.S. at the expense of Saudi Arabia." Quoted, in Roula Khalaf, "Arab Minnows Make Waves by Defying Big Neighbours," Financial Times, April 5, 2004, 5.
145. See also Craig G. Smith, "A Tiny Gulf Kingdom Bets Its Stability on Support for U.S.," New York Times, October 24, 2002, Al4 .
146. Such efforts include the Proliferation Security Initiative (which seeks to interdict WMD components), a large-scale effort to track the illegal money flows that fund terrorist operations, and other forms of law enforcement and intelligence sharing.
147. Quoted, in "France Signs UAE Base Agreement," at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080115/ ap-on-re-mi-ea/france-mideast-base
148. See John Ruggie, Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996);
149. and Ikenberry (fn. 16).
150. On U.S. control over the war and occupation, see Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2006);
151. George Packer, The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Straus, and. Giroux, 2005);
152. and Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).
153. On bonding, see G. John Ikenberry, "Strategic Responses to American Preeminence: Great Power Politics in the Age of Unipolarity," Report to the National Intelligence Council, July 28, 2003, at www.cia.gov/nicconfreports. stratereact.html
154. and Walt (fn. 8), 191-94.
155. Quoted in William Safire, "Israel, or Arafat," New York Times, December 3,2001.
156. See Nicholas Wood, "A Fake Macedonian Terror Tale That Led to Deaths," New York Times, May 17, 2004;
157. and Juliette Terzief, "A War against Terror That Went Very Wrong: Fabricating Terrorism to Win U.S. Approval," San Francisco Chronicle, June 20, 2004.
158. See Tony Smith, Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000);
159. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007).
160. See Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (New Delhi: Government of India, January 2002), xx-xxi, emphasis added. As former prime minister Atal. Vajpayee told a conference of representatives of the Indian diaspora in February 2000: "We would like you to play the role of our unofficial ambassadors by communicating the reality of a new and resurgent India to the political, cultural, business, and intellectual establishments in your host countries. Whenever the need and the occasion arise, we would like you to strongly articulate India's case to the various constituencies in your adopted countries."
161. See Prime Minister Atal. Vajpayee, "Address to the Conference on the Contributions of Persons of Indian Origin, New Delhi, February 2000, at www.indianembassy.org/special/ cabinet/Primeminister/pm-feb-12-2000.htm
162. See Mike Mclntire, "Indian-Americans Test Their Clout on Atom Pact," New York Times, June 5, 2006, 1.