Chain gangs and passed bucks: Predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity

International Organization

Volumn 44, Issue 2, 1990, Pages 137-168

  Christensen, Thomas J ^a   Snyder, Jack ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84976151554     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300035232     Document Type: Article

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