Laboratory experiments in political economy

Annual Review of Political Science

Volumn 12, Issue , 2009, Pages 379-388

  Palfrey, Thomas R ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Committees and elections; Strategic voting; Theory testing; Voter turnout

Indexed keywords

EID: 69049114391     PISSN: 10942939     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.091007.122139     Document Type: Article

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