An experimental study of storable votes

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 57, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 123-154

  Casella, Alessandra ^a,b   Gelman, Andrew ^a   Palfrey, Thomas R ^c  

^a Howard Hughes Medical Institute   (United States)

^b Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

^c CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Experiments; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749043028     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.004     Document Type: Article

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