How to confirm the conjunction of disconfirmed hypotheses

Philosophy of Science

Volumn 76, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 1-21

  Atkinson, David ^b   Peijnenburg, Jeanne ^b   Kuipers, Theo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 67651100784     PISSN: 00318248     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/598164     Document Type: Article

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