Fitch's paradox and probabilistic antirealism

Studia Logica

Volumn 86, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 149-182

  Douven, Igor ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Antirealism; Bayesian epistemology; Fitch's paradox; Truth

Indexed keywords

EID: 34249717655     PISSN: 00393215     EISSN: 15728730     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11225-007-9058-5     Document Type: Article

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