Bootstrap confirmation made quantitative

Synthese

Volumn 149, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 97-132

  Douven, Igor ^a   Meijs, Wouter ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646512208     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-004-6250-2     Document Type: Article

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