Toward a naturalistic foundation of the social contract

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 35-62

  Cordes, Christian ^a   Schubert, Christian ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b Growth and Public Policy   (Germany)

Author keywords

Empathy; Fairness; Human evolution; Intentionality; Social contract theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947503289     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-006-9011-z     Document Type: Article

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