Stateless law: Kelsen's conception and its limits

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 753-774

  Somek, Alexander ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF IOWA COLLEGE OF LAW   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845715945     PISSN: 01436503     EISSN: 14643820     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gql028     Document Type: Article

References (136)

1. For a summarized statement, see H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (1934) at 117-19.
2. Henceforth I will refer to the translation of this work by Bonnie Litschewski and Stanley L. Paulson. See Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (1992) at 99-100.
3. H. Kelsen, Der Staat als Integration. Eine prinzipielle Auseinandersetzung (1930) at 4 (my translation).
4. H. Kelsen, Der soziologische und der juristische Staatsbegriff. Kritische Untersuchung des Verhältnisses von Staat und Recht (2nd edn, 1928) at 205.
5. Kelsen, above n 1 at 98
6. Kelsen, above n 2 at 28
7. Kelsen, above n 3 at 210.
8. Above n 3 at 137-9.
9. C. Möllers, Staat als Argument (2000) at 125.
10. Hans-Joachim Koch, Einleitung, in ders., Die juristische Methode im Staatsrecht. Über Grenzen von Verfassungsund Gesetzesbindung (1977) at 67.
11. For a similar observation, see Stanley L. Paulson, 'The Theory of Public Law in Germany 1914-1945' (2005) 25 OJLS 525-45.
12. Möllers, above n 6 at 125.
13. Nevertheless, see H. Dreier, Rechtslehre, Staatssoziologie und Demokratietheorie bei Hans Kelsen (1986)
14. N. Achterberg, 'Die Reine Rechtslehre in der Staatstheorie der Bundesrepublik Deutschland' in Der Einfluss der Reinen Rechtslehre auf die Rechtstheorie in verschiedenen Ländern (1978) at 222
15. see also R. Lippold, Recht und Ordnung. Statik und Dynamik der Rechtsordnung (2000).
16. Today, constitutional theory in Germany is in a state that Kelsen would have abhorred. It is epitomized in a jurisprudence that believes in the rational pursuit of balancing. For a strong statement of such a theory, See Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (2002).
17. This term is used in the sense introduced by Husserl. See also R. Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror. Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (1986) at 111-15
18. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1977) at 22. It means overcoming the distortions of a concept suffered as a consequence of common, ordinary understandings.
19. For example, see Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (1925) at 6
20. See also Kelsen, above n 2 at 21-2.
21. Kelsen, above n 3 at 109-10 (my translation).
22. For a sketch of Kelsen's neo-Kantian phase, see S.L. Paulson, 'Introduction' in S.L. Paulson and B. Litschewski Paulson (eds), Normativity and Norms. Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes (1998) at xxiii-liii.
23. Kelsen, above n 2. Later, Kelsen was anxious, however, to present also Rudolf Smend as a main proponent of this theory.
24. Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (1913) at 137-8, 174-83, 365.
25. Ibid at 180.
26. Ibid at 179.
27. Ibid at 180-81, 'mit urspr-nglicher Herrschermacht ausgerüstete Verbandseinheit sesshafter Menschen'.
28. Kelsen, above n 3 at 114, 129-30.
29. Kelsen, above n 2 at 33-4.
30. That may have to do with the lack of clarity regarding the difference between empirical and conceptual content itself. See W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View (1961).
31. Kelsen, above n 3 at 130.
32. What Kelsen has in mind here are theories that locate the 'social' in processes of interaction. See Kelsen, above n 3 at 14-15
33. Major representatives of these theories are Simmel and Spann. See G. Simmel, Soziologie, Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung (repr. 1992)
34. O. Spann, Gesellschaftslehre (43rd edn, 1930).
35. Kelsen, above n 3 at 125, 128.
36. Kelsen, above n 12 at 12.
37. See, e.g. ibid at 16.
38. Möllers, above n 6.
39. Kelsen, above n 12 at 16.
40. Kelsen, above n 1 at 99-100.
41. Kelsen, above n 3 at 133, 206.
42. Ibid at 121.
43. Kelsen, above n 2 at 34.
44. Kelsen, above n 3 at 121.
45. Ibid at 130 (my translation).
46. Kelsen, above n 1 at 104-05.
47. Kelsen, above n 3 at 121.
48. Ibid at 122: 'There is not the slightest doubt that the system, under which the majority of "ruling relationships" appear as the unity of the state, is nothing other than the legal system, and that this system is reflected in Jellinek's constantly repeated assurance that the state is fundamentally the law' (my translation).
49. Ibid at 125.
50. Ibid at 112-13
51. see also Kelsen, above n 2 at 37, 40.
52. Kelsen, above n 3 at 126.
53. Ibid at 128.
54. Ibid at 129-30.
55. Kelsen, above n 2 at 39-46.
56. According to Smend, the 'stately chain of life' takes effect also in the 'depths' of a 'mass'. It is mediated, for example, through participation in the World War. This participation finds its lasting impression in the feeling of belonging together. Kelsen is sceptical as to what participation in war really conveys (see Kelsen, above n 2 at 40). The participant in a world war 'experiences the parade-ground drill, the trenches, the assault, the barrage and thousands of other particulars which, in their mosaic totality (the totality of experience) describe everything except the real unity of the sociological state and least of all of the unity of a particular state' (my translation).
57. Kelsen, above n 2 at 41.
58. Laconically, Kelsen establishes the following: 'The people that belong to a state want the same thing, namely the same state system, because they are treated-by this system, namely-as if they all knew this system and were in agreement with its content. This is the good old fiction of legitimization. The need to justify the state system leads to the thing which, from the standpoint of a particular view of value, could be a reason for the validity of the state system to be invented as a real fact. The same endeavour, namely, to strengthen the authority of the state, leads Smend to his fiction of the reality of the state association, which in the end reveals itself.' Ibid at 43 (my translation).
59. Kelsen, above n 12 at 16.
60. Kelsen, above n 2 at 35.
61. Regarding the concept of the 'institutional fact', see J. Searle, Speech Acts. An Essay on Philosophy of Language (1968) at 80-81
62. J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (1995) at 43-52. The term made furore in legal theory, in particular with MacCormick and Weinberger (see N. MacCormick and O. Weinberger, Grundlagen des institutionalistischen Rechtspositivismus (1985)), because it had always been used implicitly in legal theory.
63. With regard to the last point, see D.W.P. Ruiter, Institutionelle Rechtstatsachen. Rechtliche Ermächtigungen und ihre Wirkungen (1995).
64. Kelsen, above n 2 at 25.
65. I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1787) 565 (B 672).
66. The history of modern jurisprudence is largely based on the fact that this idea has not been understood as a practical standard of justification (as with Kant and later with Dworkin), but rather as theoretical assumption for the purpose of legal science. See A. Somek, Rechtssystem und Republik. ber die politische Funktion des systematischen Rechtsdenkens (1992).
67. Möllers, above n 6 at 37-8, sees this quite correctly.
68. Actually, it is based on a critical examination of meaning. See, generally, Karl-Otto Apel, Transformation der Philosophie I (1973) at 340-44.
69. Kelsen, above n 1 at 99.
70. Ibid at 99-100.
71. Kelsen, above n 3 at 248.
72. A. Somek, above n 53 at 33.
73. Kant, above n 52 at 308-11 (B 350-55).
74. Kelsen, above n 3 at 134-5;
75. Kelsen, above n 1 at 55, 119-20.
76. Kelsen, above n 3 at 134: 'The person of the state is the personification of the total legal system, the rest of the persons are personifications of partial legal systems' (my translation).
77. Kelsen, above n 1 at 100-04.
78. Kelsen, above n 1 at 26, 106.
79. This is clear in Kelsen, above n 12 at 17. Students of Derrida's writings may be inclined at this point to observe that the sociological concept of the state enters as a supplement into Kelsen's concept of law.
80. Kelsen, above n 2 at 6 (incorporating an expression of Smend).
81. In the sense of the word as used by G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (repr. 1971) at 72.
82. Kelsen, above n 1 at 96.
83. Kelsen, above n 3 at 209, 217.
84. Kelsen, above n 3 at 212-13 (following Cassirer).
85. For more on this, see A. Somek, Der Gegenstand der Rechtserkenntnis. Epitaph eines juristischen Problems (1996) at 20-26.
86. Kelsen, above n 3 at 249, even asserts that the relationship between state and law delivers the model for the theological determination of the relationships between God and nature.
87. See ibid at 221, 223-4, 227.
88. The characterizations of the status of the basic norm vary in Kelsen's work. See S.L. Paulson, 'Die unterschiedlichen Formulierungen der "Grundnorm"' in Rechtsnorm und Rechtswirklichkeit (Festschrift Krawietz) (1993).
89. One could, of course, ponder endlessly about the deontic format of the basic norm. See ibid.
90. Kelsen, above n 1 at 105.
91. Kelsen, above n 3 at 127. 'That a mental leap is possible from such an incredible dimension, without coming to the consciousness of the author, only explains that, through such a mental leap, a position is reached that is the expression of a way of thinking that is taking for granted as a natural and absolutely valid idea the hypothesizing of a unity of thinking into a real, strong-willed, powerful being' (my translation).
92. This is clear in Kelsen, above n 12 at 17. It is all the more surprising given that Kelsen was aware that 'interpretation' also involves an 'act of will'.
93. See Kelsen, above n 1 at 83.
94. See, e.g. Kelsen, above n 1 at 81-82.
95. For more on this, see A. Somek, 'Ermchtigung und Verpflichtung' in S.L. Paulson and M. Stolleis (eds), Hans Kelsen. Staatsrechtslehrer und Rechtstheoretiker des 20. Jahrhunderts (2005) 58-79;
96. A. Somek, above n 71 at 102-03.
97. See A. Somek and N. Forgé, Nachpositivistisches Rechtsdenken. Inhalt und Form des positiven Rechts (1996) at 143-76.
98. R. Brandom, Making it Explicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment (1994) at ch. 7
99. J. Habermas, Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung. Philosophische Aufsätze (1999) at 155-6.
100. Koch above n 7 at 67.
101. H. Heller, Staatslehre (1934) at 56.
102. See, more generally, Lon L. Fuller, The Principles of Social Order, K.I. Winston (ed.) (1981).
103. In particular, see Kelsen, above n 2 at 62-3.
104. Kelsen, above n 3 at 123.
105. Ibid at 124.
106. Ibid at 123.
107. I pick this up in the above-mentioned second reservation in section 11.
108. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961) at 98-9.
109. S. Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally. Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (1989) at 503-24.
110. Kelsen, above n 2 at 9-10.
111. N. Luhmann, Das Rechtssystem der Gesellschaft (1993).
112. Kelsen, above n 2 at 14.
113. Ibid at 12-13.
114. Ibid at 14.
115. Ibid at 13.
116. H. Putnam, Representation and Reality (1988) at 70.
117. This is what Kelsen writes about, above all in separating himself from 'experiencing' or from the 'oscillating' reference to the reality of the state life that Smend was so fond of.
118. R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986) at 170-71.
119. Ibid at 209-15.
120. These quotes appear in one and the same sentence in Kelsen, above n 12 at 16. My talk of oscillating formulations derives from a little malice_Kelsen ranted and raved against Smend's method of 'oscillations'. See Kelsen, above n 2 at 16 and passim.
121. According to Heidemann, Kelsen came to adopt this view in his 'post-neo-Kantian period'. See C. Heidemann, Die Norm als Tatsache. Zur Normentheorie Hans Kelsens (1997) at 66, 185. What this view is precisely about and whether it was indeed ever held by Kelsen was subject to subtle controversy.
122. See S. L. Paulson, 'Four Phases in Kelsen's Legal Theory? Reflections on a Periodisation' (1998) 18 OJLS 153
123. C. Heidemann, 'Norms, Facts, and Judgements. A Reply to S. L. Paulson' (1999) 19 OJLS 345
124. S.L. Paulson, 'Arriving at a Defensible Periodisation of Hans Kelsen's Legal Theory' (1999) 19 OJLS 351.
125. Heidemann, Norm as Tatsache, above n 104 at 66.
126. C. Demmerling, Sprache und Verdinglichung. Wittgenstein, Adorno und das Projekt einer kritischen Theorie (1994).
127. A. Somek, above n 53, above n 71, Somek/Forgó, above n 81 and of course the classic exposition by J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (2nd edn, 1990).
128. S.L. Paulson 'The Weak Reading of Authority and Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law', Law and Philosophy 19 (2000) 131-71
129. S.L. Paulson, Faktum/Wert-Distinktion: Zwei-Welten-Lehre und immanenter Sinn. Hans Kelsen als Neukantianer in R. Alexy et al. (eds), Neukantianismus und Rechtsphilosophie (2002) at 223-51.
130. For more on the creation of classes within the legal system, see Somek, above n 71.
131. R. Christensen and H. Kudlich, Theorie richterlichen Begründens (2001).
132. See Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Postmoderne Rechtstheorie. Selbstreferenz_SelbstorganisationΡozeduralisierung (1992).
133. See G. Gamm, Flucht aus der Kategorie. Die Positivierung des Unbestimmten als Ausgang der Moderne (1994).
134. See, e.g. M. Albrow, The Global Age. State and Society Beyond Modernity (1996);
135. M. Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (1999).
136. See A. Somek 'Gesetzesbindung als Problem der Demokratie', Journal für Rechtspolitik 6 (1998).