Board composition, ownership structure and hostile takeovers: Some UK evidence

Accounting and Business Research

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 139-155

  O'Sullivan, Noel ^a   Wong, Pauline ^a  

^a LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0004942530     PISSN: 00014788     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00014788.1999.9729575     Document Type: Article

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