Chapter 62 Game theory and experimental gaming

Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications

Volumn 3, Issue , 2002, Pages 2327-2351

  Shubik, Martin ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

coalitional form; context; experimental gaming; game theory; minimax

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649323413     PISSN: 15740005     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0005(02)03025-4     Document Type: Review

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