Forward induction and public randomization

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 43-64

  Gul, Faruk ^a   Pearce, David G ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030188345     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0075     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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