Chapter 19 Intellectual Property Law

Handbook of Law and Economics

Volumn 2, Issue , 2007, Pages 1473-1570

  Menell, Peter S ^a   Scotchmer, Suzanne ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

antitrust; copyright; goodwill; government funding; Innovation; licensing; patent; R D; trade secret; trademark

Indexed keywords

EID: 67649342185     PISSN: 15740730     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0730(07)02019-1     Document Type: Review

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