Chapter 32 An Empirical Perspective on Auctions

Handbook of Industrial Organization

Volumn 3, Issue , 2007, Pages 2073-2143

  Hendricks, Ken ^a   Porter, Robert H ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Auctions; Bid rigging; Bidding; Collusion; Estimation; Identification

Indexed keywords

EID: 66049097703     PISSN: 1573448X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1573-448X(06)03032-9     Document Type: Review

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