Collusion proof transfer payment schemes with multiple agents

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 217-233

  Li, Shu Hsing ^a   Balachandran, Kashi R ^b  

^a NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Collusion; Information asymmetry; Information rent; Multiple agents; Transfer pricing

Indexed keywords

EID: 36448974271     PISSN: 0924865X     EISSN: 15737179     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008319922513     Document Type: Article

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