Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 25-50

  Ghosal, Sayantan ^a   Lockwood, Ben ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 65049091867     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-008-0344-6     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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