Trust and reciprocity in incentive contracting

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 70, Issue 1-2, 2009, Pages 93-105

  Rigdon, Mary ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Experimental economics; Incentive contracts; Principal agent; Reciprocity; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 64249124072     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.01.006     Document Type: Article

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