On the incentives to experiment in federations

Journal of Urban Economics

Volumn 60, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 484-497

  Kotsogiannis, Christos ^a,b   Schwager, Robert ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b ATHENS UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Greece)

^c UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Fiscal federalism; Policy experimentation; Policy innovation

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749316785     PISSN: 00941190     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2006.04.008     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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