Is there a causal link between currency and debt crises?

International Journal of Finance and Economics

Volumn 11, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 305-325

  Dreher, Axel ^a   Herz, Bernhard ^b   Karb, Volker ^b  

^a KOF SWISS ECONOMIC INSTITUTE   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BAYREUTH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Contagion; Currency crises; Debt crises

Indexed keywords

CURRENCY MARKET; DEBT CRISIS; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS;

EID: 33750317345     PISSN: 10769307     EISSN: 10991158     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/ijfe.300     Document Type: Article

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