Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives

Journal of Urban Economics

Volumn 65, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 279-293

  Weingast, Barry R ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Fiscal federalism; Intergovernmental relations; Revenue; State and local taxation

Indexed keywords

EID: 63149150002     PISSN: 00941190     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2008.12.005     Document Type: Article

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