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Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 185-205

Decentralization of governance and development

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0040671434     PISSN: 08953309     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/089533002320951037     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (1025)

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