Saving the truth schema from paradox

Journal of Philosophical Logic

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 1-27

  Field, Hartry ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Conditionals; Law of excluded middle; Paradoxes; Truth

Indexed keywords

EID: 14044261192     PISSN: 00223611     EISSN: 15730433     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1015063620612     Document Type: Article

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