Indisputably essential: The economics of dispute settlement institutions in trade agreements

Journal of World Trade

Volumn 42, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 785-812

  Keck, Alexander ^a   Schropp, Simon ^b  

^a WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION   (Switzerland)

^b SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DISPUTE RESOLUTION; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; LAW ENFORCEMENT; THEORETICAL STUDY; TRADE AGREEMENT;

EID: 60849123954     PISSN: 10116702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.54648/trad2008032     Document Type: Article

References (82)

1. Abbott, K., & D. Snidal, 'Why States Act through Formal International Organizations'. Journal of Conflict Resolution 1, no. 42 (1998): 3-32.
2. Axelrod, R. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 1984.
3. Bagwell, K., & R.W. Staiger. 'A Theory of Managed Trade'. American Economic Review 4, no. 80 (1990): 779-795.
4. Bagwell, K., & R.W. Staiger. 'Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and International Economic Institutions'. Quarterly Journal of Economics 2, no. 116 (2001): 519-562.
5. Bagwell, K., & R.W. Staiger, The economics of the world trading system. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002.
6. Bagwell, K., & R.W. Staiger. 'Enforcement, Private Political Pressure, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Escape Clause'. Journal of Legal Studies 34 (2005a): 471-513.
7. Bagwell, K., & R.W. Staiger. 'Enforcement, Private Political Pressure and the GATT/WTO Escape Clause', mimeo (2005b).
8. Bagwell, K., P.C. Mavroidis & R.W. Staiger. 'It's a Question of Market Access'. American Journal of International Law 1, no. 96 (2002): 56-76.
9. Bagwell, K., P.C. Mavroidis & R.W. Staiger. 'The Case for Auctioning Countermeasures in the WTO'. National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No. 9920. Cambridge, MA: NBER, 2003.
10. Battigalli, P., & G. Maggi. 'Rigidity, Discretion, and the Costs of Writing Contracts'. American Economic Review 4, no. 92 (2002): 798-817.
11. Bernhardt, W., L. Broz & D. Leblang. 'Special Issue on the Political Economy of Monetary Institutions', International Organization (Autumn), (2002): 693-860.
12. Bütler, M., & H. Hauser. 'The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: A First Assessment from an Economic Perspective'. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 2, no. 16 (2002): 503-533.
13. Craswell, R. 'Contract Law: General Theories'. In Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics edited by B. Bouckaert and G. de Geest. Ghent: Edward Elgar/University of Ghent, 1999 ch. 4000, pp. 1-24.
14. Copeland, B. 'Strategic Interaction among Nations: Negotiable and Non-Negotiable Trade Barriers'. Canadian Journal of Economics 1, no. 23 (1990): 84-108.
15. Davey, W.J. 'Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded Its Authority? A Consideration of Deference Shown by the System to Member Government Decisions and Its Use of Issue-Avoidance Techniques'. Journal of International Economic Law 1, no. 4 (2001): 79-110.
16. Davey, W.J. (2005), Evaluating WTO Dispute Settlement: What Results Have Been Achieved through Consultations and Implementation of Panel Reports?, paper presented at the Conference on 'WTO at 10', Tokyo, 25 October 2005.
17. Dixit, A. 'Strategic Aspects of Trade Policy', In Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, edited by T.F. Bewley. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987 pp. 329-362.
18. Downs, G.W., & D. Rocke. Optimal Imperfection? Institutions and Domestic Politics in International Relations. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995.
19. Dunoff, J.L., & J.P. Trachtman. 'Economic Analysis of International Law'. Yale Journal of International Law 1, no. 24 (1999): 1-59.
20. Durling, J.P. 'Deference, But Only When Due: WTO Review of Anti-Dumping Measures'. Journal of International Economic Law 1, no. 6 (2003): 125-153.
21. Ethier, W.J. (2001), Punishments and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements, Penn Institute for Economic Research (PIER) Working Paper 01-021 (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania).
22. Ethier, W.J. 'Political Externalities, Non-discrimination, and a Mulitlateral World'. Review of International Economics 3, no. 12 (2004a): 303-320.
23. Ethier, W.J. (2004b), Trade Policies Based on Political Externalities: An Exploration, Penn Institute for Economic Research (PIER) Working Paper 04-006 (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania).
24. Ethier, W.J. (2006), Selling Protection for Sale, PIER Working Paper 06-14 (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania).
25. Fearon, J.D. 'Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation'. International Organization 2, no. 52 (1998): 269-305.
26. Furusawa, T. 'The Optimal Penal Code vs. Infinite Nash Reversion in Trade Liberalization'. Review of International Economics 4, no. 7 (1999): 673-681
27. Greenwald, J. 'WTO Dispute Settlement: An Exercise in Trade Law Legislation?'. Journal of International Economic Law 1, no. 6 (2003): 113-124.
28. Greif, A., P. Milgrom & B.R. Weingast. 'Merchant gilds'. Journal of Political Economy, 102 (1994): 745-776.
29. Grossman, G.M., & E. Helpman. 'Trade Wars and Trade Talks'. Journal of Political Economy 4, no. 103 (1995): 675.
30. Hauser, H., & A. Roitinger. 'Two Perspectives on International Trade Agreements'. Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 3, no. 64 (2004): 641-658.
31. Herzing, M. Essays on Uncertainty and Escape in Trade Agreements. Stockholm: dissertation at Stockholm University, 2005.
32. Hippler Bello, J. 'The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More'. American Journal of International Law 3, 90 (1996): 416-418.
33. Horn, H., G. Maggi & R.W. Staiger, 'The GATT/WTO as an Incomplete Contract and the Role of Dispute Settlement Procedures'. mimeo 2005.
34. Horn, H., G. Maggi & R.W. Staiger. 'The GATT/WTO as an Incomplete Contract'. mimeo 2006.
35. Hungerford, T. 'GATT: A cooperative equilibrium in a non-cooperative trading regime?'. Journal of International Economics 3-4, no. 31 (1991): 357-369.
36. Irwin, D.A. Against the Tide: Intellectual History of Free Trade. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.
37. Kaplow, L., & S. Shavell. 'Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis'. Harvard Law Review 4, no. 109 (1996): 713-790.
38. Keohane, R. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
39. Klimenko, M., G. Ramey &J. Watson. 'Recurrent Trade Agreements and the Value of External Enforcement'. mimeo 2002.
40. Kovenock, D., & M. Thursby. 'GATT dispute settlement and cooperation'. Economics and Politics 2, 4 (1993): 151-170.
41. Krishna, P., & D. Mitra..'Reciprocated Unilateralism. A Political Economy Perspective'. mimeo 1999.
42. Krishna, P., & D. Mitra. 'Reciprocated Unilateralism in Trade Policy'. Journal of International Economics 2, no. 65 (2005): 461-487.
43. Kydland F., & E. Prescott. 'Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans'. Journal of Political Economy 3, no. 85 (1977): 473-491.
44. Johnson, H.G. 'Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation'. Review of Economic Studies 2, 21 (1953): 142-153.
45. Lawrence, R.Z. Crimes and Punishments? Retaliation under the WTO. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2003.
46. Leibowitz, L.E., Safety Valve or Flash Point? The Worsening Conflict Between US Trade Laws and WTO Rules, Briefing Paper No. 17 Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2001.
47. Ludema, R.D. 'Optimal international trade agreements and dispute settlement procedures'. European Journal of Political Economy, 17 (2001): 355-376.
48. MacLeod, W.B. Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts, CESifo - Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research Working Paper No. 1730. Munich: CESifo, 2006.
49. Maggi, G. 'The role of multilateral institutions in international trade cooperation'. American Economic Review 1, no. 89 (1999): 190-213.
50. Maggi, G., & A. Rodriguez-Clare, The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressure, Journal of Political Economy 3, no. 106 (1998): 574-601.
51. Masten, S.E. 'Contractual Choice', In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics edited by B. Bouckaert and G. de Geest. Ghent: Edward Elgar/University of Ghent, 1999 ch. 4100, pp. 25-45.
52. Mavroidis, P. Trade in Goods Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
53. McRae, D. 'What is the Future of WTO Dispute Settlement?'. Journal of International Economic Law 1, no. 7 (2004): 3-21.
54. Menard, C. (ed.) The International Library of the New Institutional Economics, Vol. 7 Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004.
55. Milgrom, P.R., D.C. North & B.R. Weingast. 'The Role cf Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs'. Economics and Politics 1, no. 2 (1990): 1-23.
56. Mitra, D. 'Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection'. American Economic Review 5, no. 89 (1999): 1116-1143.
57. North, D.C. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
58. North, D.C. Understanding the Process of Institutional Change Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.
59. Oye, K. Cooperation under Anarchy Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.
60. Ozden, C. Trade Agreements Under Asymmetric Information and Efficiency Gains from WTO's Dispute Settlement Process mimeo, Emory University, 2001.
61. Pauwelyn, J. 'The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?'. American Journal of International Law 3, no. 95 (2001): 535-578.
62. Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. Press, 1971.
63. Regan, D. 'What Are Trade Agreements For? - Two Conflicting Stories Told by Economists, With a Lesson for Lawyers'. Journal of International Economic Law 4, no. 9 (2006): 951-988.
64. Rosendorff, B.P. 'Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Procedures'. American Political Science Review 3, 99 (2005): 389-400.
65. Rosendorff, B.P., & H.V. Milner. 'The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape'. International Organization 4, no. 55 (2001): 829-857.
66. Schwartz, W.F., & A.O. Sykes. 'The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the WTO/GATT System'. Journal of Legal Studies 1, no. 31 (2002): 179-204.
67. Shavell, S. 'Damage Measures for Breach of Contract'. Bell Journal of Economics 2, 11 (1980): 466-490.
68. Snidal, D. 'Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation'. American Political Science Review 3, no. 85 (1993): 701-726.
69. Srinivasan, T.N. 'Non-discrimination in GATT/WTO: Was there anything to begin with and is there anything left?'. World Trade Review 1, no. 41 (2005): 69-95.
70. Staiger, R.W. 'International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy', In Handbook of International Economics, vol. III edited by Grossman G. and K. Rogoff. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1995 pp. 1495.
71. Staiger, R.W., & G. Tabellini. 'Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection'. American Economic Review 5, no. 77 (1987): 823-837.
72. Staiger, R.W., & G. Tabellini. 'Rules and Discretion in Trade Policy'. American Economic Review 6, no.33 (1989): 1265-1277.
73. Staiger, R.W., & G. Tabellini. 'Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?', Economics and Politics 2, no. 11 (1999): 109-144.
74. Stein, A. 'Coordination and Collaboration Regimes in an Anarchic World', In International Regimes edited by S.D. Krasner. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983 pp 115-140.
75. Sykes, A. O. 'Protectionism as a 'Safeguard': A Positive Analysis of the GATT 'Escape Clause' With Normative Speculations'. University of Chicago Law Review 1, no. 58 (1991): 255.
76. Sykes, A.O. 'International Trade', In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics edited by B. Bouckaert and G. de Geest. Ghent: Edward Elgar/University of Ghent, 1999 pp 1114-1132.
77. Sykes, A.O. 'The Pemedy for Breach of Obligations under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance?', In New Directions in International Economic Law edited by M. Bronckers and R. Quick. The Hagues: Kluwer Law International, 2000 pp 347-357.
78. Tarullo, D.K. 'The Hidden Costs of International Dispute Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions'. Law and Policy in International Business 1, no. 34 (2002): 109-181.
79. Thompson, A., & D. Snidal (2005), Guarding the Equilibrium: Regime Management in the WTO, working paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
80. Williamson, O.E. 'Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations'. Journal of Law and Economics 22 (October) (1979): 233-261.
81. Williamson, O.E. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism New York: Free Press, 1985.
82. Williamson, O.E. 'The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead'. Journal of Economic Literature 3, no. 38 (2000): 595-613.