The optimal penal code vs. infinite nash reversion in trade liberalization

Review of International Economics

Volumn 7, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 673-6681

  Furusawa, Taiji ^a  

^a YOKOHAMA NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INTERNATIONAL TRADE; TARIFF STRUCTURE; THEORETICAL STUDY; TRADE LIBERALIZATION;

EID: 0033391968     PISSN: 09657576     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9396.00192     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. Abreu, Dilip, "Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames," Journal of Economic Theory 39 (1986):191-225.
2. _, "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica 56 (1988):383-96.
3. Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger, "A Theory of Managed Trade," American Economic Review 80 (1990):779-95.
4. _, "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation during the Formation of Free Trade Areas," International Economic Review 38 (1997a):291-319.
5. _, "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation during the Formation of Customs Unions," Journal of International Economics 42 (1997b):91-123.
6. Cotter, Kevin D. and Shannon K. Mitchell, "Renegotiation-Proof Tariff Agreements," Review of International Economics 5 (1997):348-72.
7. Cronshaw, Mark B. and Thomas F. Rutherford, "(Even Impatient) Little Countries Can Win Tariff Wars," unpublished manuscript (1994).
8. Dixit, Avinash, "Strategic Aspects of Trade Policy," in Truman F. Bewley (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1987):329-62.
9. Fudenberg, Drew and Eric Maskin, "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory 51 (1990):194-206.
10. Furusawa, Taiji, "The Negotiation of Sustainable Tariffs," Journal of International Economics 48 (1999):321-45.
11. "In Trade Dispute With Japan, Both Sides See Misjudgments," New York Times, 1 June 1995, p.A1.