Do GATT rules help governments make domestic commitments?

Economics and Politics

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 109-144

  Staiger, Robert W ^a   Tabellini, Guido ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b University of Wisconsin ^*

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0011123848     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00055     Document Type: Article

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