Fiscal consequences of electoral institutions

Journal of Law and Economics

Volumn 52, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 469-495

  Berry, Christopher R ^a   Gersen, Jacob E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 59549091698     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/595764     Document Type: Article

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