Tiebout with politics: Capital tax competition and constitutional choices

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 133-154

  Perroni, Carlo ^a   Scharf, Kimberley A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; POLITICAL ECONOMY; TAX SYSTEM;

EID: 0035053507     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00163     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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5. Optimal jurisdiction fragmentation and mobility
6. Tax competition with two tax instruments
7. Valuation equilibrium with clubs
8. Equivalence of the core and competitive equilibrium in a tiebout economy with crowding types
9. Anonymous pricing in public goods economies
10. Tax competition and leviathan
11. Equilibrium among local jurisdictions: Toward an integrated treatment of voting and pesidential choice
12. The implications of competition among jurisdicitions: Does tiebout need politics?
13. An examination of multijurisdictional corporate income taxation under formula apportionment
14. Too much conformity? A hotelling model of local public goods supply
15. Is bilateralism bad?
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22. The tiebout hypothesis: Near optimality in local public good economies
23. Stable coalition structures with externalities
24. Pigou, tiebout, property taxation and the underprovision of local public goods