When right: Makes might How Prussia overturned the European balance of power

International Security

Volumn 33, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 110-142

  Goddard, Stacie E ^a  

^a WELLESLEY COLLEGE   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 59249087748     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2009.33.3.110     Document Type: Article

References (214)

1. For exceptions, see James W Davis Jr., Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), pp. 44-74;
2. and Branislav L. Slantchev, "Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium," Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4 Guly 2005), pp. 565-606.
3. On Schleswig-Holstein in European politics, see Lawrence D. Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932);
4. William E. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-71 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp. 146-212;
5. William E. Mosse, "Queen Victoria and Her Ministers in the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis, 1863-1864," English Historical Review, Vol. 78, No. 307 (April 1963), pp. 263-283;
6. Chester Wells Clark, Franz Joseph and Bismarck: The Diplomacy of Austria before the War of 1866 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1934), pp. 55-122;
7. William E. Echard, Napoleon III and the Concert of Europe. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983), pp. 203-208;
8. and William Carr, Schleswig-Holstein, 1815-1848: A Study in National Conflict (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1963).
9. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-71, pp. 148-152;
10. and Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, pp. 110-168.
11. See Clark, Franz Joseph and Bismarck;
12. Charles W. Hallberg, Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, 1852-1864: A Study of Austro-French Relations (New York: Bookman, 1955);
13. Roy A. Austensen, "Austria and the 'Struggle for Supremacy in Germany/ 1848-1864," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 52, No. 2 (June 1980), pp. 195-225;
14. and Richard B. Elrod, "Bernhard von Rechberg and the Metternichian Tradition: The Dilemma of Conservative Statecraft," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 56, No. 3 (June 1984), pp. 430-455.
15. See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), pp. 157-162;
16. and Thomas J. Christensen and Jack L. Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168.
17. See Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006);
18. and Randall L. Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004), pp. 159-201.
19. This mechanism represents a case of "rhetorical coercion." See Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick T. Jackson, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 2007), pp. 35-66.
20. On "ontological security," see Jennifer Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 12, No. 3 (September 2006), pp. 341-370.
21. See also Richard Little, "British Neutrality versus Offshore Balancing in the American Civil War: The English School Strikes Back," Security Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 2007), pp. 68-95.
22. See G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001);
23. G. John Ikenberry, "Is American Multilateralism in Decline?" Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 2003), pp. 533-550;
24. and Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005).
25. This draws from Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, pp. 3-8.
26. See Carr, Schlesivig-Holstein, 1815-1848;
27. and Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, pp. 22-32.
28. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-71, p. 146.
29. Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, p. 105.
30. See also Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Unification, 1815-1871 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 234-240.
31. See speeches on the Danish question by Mr. Disraeli and Lord Palmerston, House of Commons, April 19,1949, in Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt, eds., British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print Part 1: From the Mid-nineteenth Century to the First World War (hereafter BFDA), Vol. 17, Series F: Europe, Denmark, 1848-1914 (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America), docs. 6, 15.
32. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-71, p. 19.
33. Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, p. 110.
34. See, for example, Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-71, pp. 146-212;
35. and Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, pp. 110-168.
36. Schweller, Unanswered Threats.
37. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 268.
38. See also Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 1865-1940," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 65-97.
39. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 159.
40. Ibid., p. 291.
41. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-71, p. 5.
42. On Russian interests, see Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany;
43. Robert H. Lord, "Bismarck and Russia in 1863," American Historical Review, Vol. 29, No. 1 (October 1923), pp. 2-48.
44. See Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-71, pp. 15-17;
45. and Frank G. Weber, "Palmerston and Prussian Liberalism, 1848," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June 1963), pp. 125-136.
46. See Clark, Franz Joseph and Bismarck;
47. Hallberg, Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, 1852-1864; Austensen, "Austria and the 'Struggle for Supremacy in Germany/ 1848-1864";
48. and Elrod, "Bernhard von Rechberg and the Metternichian Tradition."
49. See, for example, Echard, Napoleon III and the Concert of Europe;
50. Ann E. Pottinger, Napoleon III and the German Crisis, 1865-1866 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966);
51. and Lawrence C. Jennings, "French Diplomacy and the First Schleswig-Holstein Crisis," French Historical Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Autumn 1971), pp. 204-224.
52. Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, pp. 110-168;
53. Carr, Schleswig-Holstein, 1815-1848;
54. and Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-71.
55. Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, p. 130.
56. Robert L. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58-113.
57. On balancing against threat, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
58. On limited aims revisionists, see Schweller, Unanswered Threats, pp. 29-37;
59. and David M. Edelstein, "Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers," Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Fall 2002), pp. 1-40.
60. Schweller, Unanswered Threats, p. 32.
61. Similarly, David Edelstein describes Prussia's intentions as "uncertain" but "malleable."
62. Edelstein, "Managing Uncertainty," pp. 18-31.
63. See W.L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890 (New York: Knopf, 1931), p. 145.
64. Clark, Franz Joseph and Bismarck, p. 60.
65. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 58-113.
66. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 161-193;
67. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 338-344;
68. and Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks."
69. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 269-272;
70. Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks";
71. and Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe."
72. Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks." Note that the offense-defense balance does not account for variation between 1848 and 1864.
73. Schweller, Unanswered Threats, p. 11.
74. Ibid.
75. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-71, p. 161;
76. Mosse, "Queen Victoria and Her Ministers in the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis, 1863-1864";
77. and Keith A.P. Sandiford, Great Britain and the Schleswig-Holstein Question, 1848-64: A Study in Diplomacy, Politics, and Public Opinion (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975).
78. Mosse, "Queen Victoria and Her Ministers in the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis, 1863-1864."
79. This argument is associated with work on "cheap talk."
80. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989).
81. On legitimacy and constructivism, see Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Spring 1999), pp. 379-408;
82. and Erik Voeten, "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force," International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 527-557.
83. This is not always the case. Some constructivists argue that legitimacy augments material power. See Voeten, "The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force"; and Little, "British Neutrality versus Offshore Balancing in the American Civil War." Likewise, there are realists who contend that norms and ideas constrain great power behavior.
84. See Walt, Taming American Power.
85. See Ikenberry, "Is American Multilateralism in Decline?";
86. and Walt, Taming American Power. Some argue that the war in Iraq has led to "soft balancing."
87. See Edelstein, "Managing Uncertainty";
88. and Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 44-45.
89. See Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000).
90. Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Fall 1994), pp. 108-148;
91. and Victoria Tin-bor Hui, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
92. See also William C. Wohlforth, Richard Little, Stuart J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A. Jones, Victoria Tin-bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney, and William L. Brenner, "Testing Balance of Power Theory in World History," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 2007), p. 158.
93. See Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Extending and Refining the Spiral Model," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538;
94. Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201;
95. Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 371-400;
96. and Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114-155.
97. Evan Braden Montgomery, "Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty," International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006), pp. 151-185.
98. See Daniel H. Nexon, Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009).
99. Ikenberry, After Victory;
100. G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 5 (September/October 2002), pp. 44-60;
101. Ikenberry, "Is American Multilateralism in Decline?";
102. Walt, Taming American Power;
103. and Mlada Bukovansky, legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).
104. See Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy";
105. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited";
106. Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model";
107. Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing";
108. and Montgomery, "Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma."
109. See Fred Kniss, "Ideas and Symbols as Resources in Intrareligious Conflict: The Case of American Mennonites," Sociology of Religion, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 7-23.
110. Edelstein, "Managing Uncertainty."
111. G. John. Ikenberry, After Victory;
112. and Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," in Ethan B. Kapstein and Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 138-181.
113. Krebs and Jackson, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms," p. 45.
114. See Robert L. Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), pp. 5-6.
115. On hypocrisy costs, see, for example, Daryl Glaser, "Does Hypocrisy Matter? The Case of U.S. Foreign Policy," Review of International Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (April 2006), pp. 251-268.
116. Little, "British Neutrality versus Offshore Balancing in the American Civil War."
117. Krebs and Jackson, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms."
118. For a discussion of ontological security, see Mitzen, "Ontological Security in World Politics."
119. On wedge strategies, see Timothy W. Crawford, "Wedge Strategy, Balancing, and the Deviant Case of Spain, 1940-41," Security Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (January-March 2008), pp. 1-38.
120. See James J. Sheehan, "Liberalism and Society in Germany, 1815-48," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 45, No. 4 (December 1973), pp. 583-604.
121. Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany;
122. and Otto Pflanze, "Bismarck and German Nationalism," American Historical Review, Vol. 60, No. 3 (1955), pp. 548-566.
123. Bismarck to Bernstorff, communicated to Earl Russell by Count Bernstorff, October 30, 1863, Berlin, October 27, 1863, BDFA, doc. 34.
124. John Padgett and Christopher Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 98, No. 6 (1993), p. 1263.
125. Quoted in the Times, December 3, 1863, p. 8.
126. Quoted in the Times, December 21, 1863, p. 12.
127. Ibid. See also Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, p. 242.
128. Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, p. 107.
129. See, for example, Heinrich Friedjung, The Struggle for Supremacy in Germany, 1859-1866 (London: Macmillan, 1935).
130. Compare with Austensen, "Austria and the 'Struggle for Supremacy in Germany/ 1848-1864."
131. Quoted in Elrod, "Bernhard von Rechberg and the Metternichian Tradition," p. 438.
132. Count Belcredi to Conte Malaguzzi, October 25,1865, quoted in Clark, Franz Joseph and Bismarck, p. 27.
133. Quoted in Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany, p. 235.
134. Quoted in Clark, Franz Joseph and Bismarck, p. 57.
135. Quoted in ibid., p. 58.
136. Bismarck to Bernstorff, BDFA, doc. 34.
137. Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, p. 106.
138. Quoted in Elrod, "Bernhard von Rechberg and the Metternichian Tradition," p. 451.
139. See, for example, Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, pp. 79-109;
140. J.V. Clardy, "Austrian Foreign Policy during the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis of 1864: An Exercise in Reactive Planning and Negative Formulations," Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1991), pp. 254-269;
141. and Clark, Franz Joseph and Bismarck, especially chap. 2.
142. Clark, Franz Joseph and Bismarck, pp. 58-59.
143. Ibid., p. 60.
144. Ibid.
145. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 3d ser., Vol. 172, col. 1252.
146. Quoted in Sir Spencer Walpole, The Life of Lord John Russell (New York: Greenwood, 1968), p. 388.
147. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-71, p. 162.
148. Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, pp. 110-168;
149. and Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-71, p. 146.
150. Denmark was in breach because, by administering Schleswig separately from Holstein, it was violating the principle that the duchies were indivisible.
151. Mosse, "Queen Victoria and Her Ministers in the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis, 1863-1864";
152. and Herbert C.F. Bell, Lord Palmerston, Vol. 2 (London: Longmans, Green, 1936), pp. 373-380.
153. See Bell, Lord Palmerston, pp. 376-377.
154. Quoted in ibid., p. 11.
155. London Review, May 7, 1864,
156. quoted in Mosse, "Queen Victoria and Her Ministers in the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis, 1863-1864," p. 278.
157. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 3d ser., Vol. 185, col. 609.
158. Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, p. 61.
159. Times, March 30, 1863, p. 12.
160. William M. Sloane, "Bismarck's Apprenticeship," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September 1899), p. 437;
161. Bell, Lord Palmerston, pp. 376-377;
162. and Mosse, "Queen Victoria and Her Ministers in the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis, 1863-1864."
163. Quoted in the Times, February 5, 1864, p. 5.
164. Quoted in the Times, December 3, 1863, p. 8.
165. Palmerston to Russell, May 1, 1864, in Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, eds., Foundations of British Foreign Policy, 1792-1902 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), p. 269.
166. Palmerston to Hall, quoted in Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, p. 174.
167. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 3d ser., Vol. 182, cols. 107, 111.
168. See Echard, Napoleon III and the Concert of Europe;
169. Pottinger, Napoleon III and the German Crisis;
170. and Jennings, "French Diplomacy and the First Schleswig-Holstein Crisis."
171. Charles-Victor Lobstein to Lamartine, May 5, 1848, quoted in Jennings, "French Diplomacy and the First Schleswig-Holstein Crisis," p. 213.
172. Times, February 3, 1864, p. 5.
173. Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, p. 115.
174. Ibid., p. 179.
175. See Echard, Napoleon III and the Concert of Europe;
176. Pottinger, Napoleon III and the German Crisis;
177. and David Baguley, Napoleon III and His Regime: An Extravaganza (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000).
178. Quoted in Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, p. 96.
179. Quoted in David Wetzel, A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Franco-Prussian War (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001), p. 28.
180. Les Origines Diplomatique de la Guerre de 1870-1871, Vol. 2 [Diplomatic origins of the war of 1870-1871] (Paris: G. Ficker, 1910), p. 349.
181. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-71, p. 128.
182. Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, p. 216.
183. See ibid., p. 183; Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-71, pp. 186-189;
184. Hallberg, Franz Joseph and Napoleon III, 1852-1864, pp. 314-341;
185. and Echard, Napoleon III and the Concert of Europe, pp. 193-210.
186. Quoted in Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, p. 183.
187. Walpole, The Life of Lord John Russell, p. 390.
188. Ibid.
189. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, April 26, 1848, document printed in Fedor Fedorovich Martens, ed., Recueil des Traités et Conventions Conclus par la Russie avec les Puissances, Vol. 8 [Collection of treaties and conventions concluded by Russia with the powers] (Paris: Foreign Ministry, 1888), p. 375.
190. Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, p. 130.
191. Slantchev, "Territory and Commitment," pp. 603-604.
192. Thun to Rechberg, January 26, 1864, No. 1B: Politisches Archiv Haus, Hof, und Staatsarchiv (Vienna), PAX 55, in Clardy, "Austrian Foreign Policy during the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis of 1864," p. 264. See also Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-71, p. 72.
193. See Lord, "Bismarck and Russia in 1863."
194. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-71.
195. Napier to Russell, No. 823, most confidential, December 30, 1863, RA I 92/175, quoted in ibid., p. 165.
196. Ibid., p. 167.
197. Ibid., p. 168. For a discussion, see also Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, p. 200.
198. Quoted in Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question, p. 131.
199. Quoted in ibid., p. 200.
200. Memorandum of the Transaction Which Preceded the War between Denmark and Germany, BFDA, doc. 39.
201. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-71, p. 172, translation by author.
202. Austria's diplomacy also ensured French neutrality.
203. Again, this is not to downplay the role of realist factors in these conflicts. Bismarck's promise to Britain and Russia that he would help settle the Black Sea question was key in buying their acquiescence. See Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany.
204. See Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51;
205. Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United. States," International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp. 7-45;
206. and William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41.
207. See Ikenberry, "Is American Multilateralism in Decline?"; and Walt, Taming American Power.
208. Bruce Cronin, "The Paradox of Hegemony: America's Ambiguous Relationship with the United Nations," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2001), pp. 103-130, at p. 113.
209. For the debate over the rise of China, see Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" International. Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 5-56;
210. Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up: China's Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5-40;
211. Avery Goldstein, "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice," China Quarterly, Vol. 168 (December 2001), pp. 835-864;
212. and Michael A. Glosny, "Grand Strategies of Rising Powers: Reassurance, Coercion, and Balancing Responses," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009.
213. See Goldstein, "The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy";
214. and Glosny, "Grand Strategies of Rising Powers."