Fiscal federalism and lobbying

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 92, Issue 12, 2008, Pages 2288-2301

  Bordignon, Massimo ^a   Colombo, Luca ^a   Galmarini, Umberto ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF INSUBRIA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Common agency; Fiscal federalism; Games played through agents; Lobbying

Indexed keywords

EID: 55149087706     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.05.003     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. Alesina A., Angeloni I., and Schuknecht L. What does the European Union do?. Public Choice 123 (2005) 275-319
2. Bardhan P., and Mookherjee D. Capture and governance at local and national levels. American Economic Review 90 2 (2000) 135-139
3. Bardhan P., and Mookherjee D. Relative capture of local and central governments: an essay in the political economy of decentralization. UC Berkeley Working Paper. Center for International and Development Economics Research vol. 1013 (2002)
4. Bennedsen M., and Feldmann S.E. Lobbying legislatures. Journal of Political Economy 110 (2002) 919-946
5. Bennedsen M., and Feldmann S.E. Informational lobbying and political contributions. Journal of Public Economics 90 (2006) 631-656
6. Bernheim B.D., and Whinston M.D. Common agency. Econometrica 54 (1986) 923-942
7. Bernheim B.D., and Whinston M.D. Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 101 (1986) 1-31
8. Besley T., and Coate S. Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy analysis. Journal of Public Economics 87 (2003) 2611-2637
9. Besley T., and Smart M. Fiscal restraints and voter welfare. Journal of Public Economics 91 (2007) 755-773
10. Bordignon M., Cerniglia F., and Revelli F. Yardstick competition in intergovernmental relationships: theory and empirical predictions. Economics Letters 83 (2004) 325-333
11. Brou D., and Ruta M. Special interests and the gains from political integration. Economics and Politics 18 (2006) 191-218
12. De Melo J., Panagariya A., and Rodrik D. The new regionalism: a country perspective. In: de Melo J., and Panagariya A. (Eds). New dimensions in Regional Integration (1993), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
13. Dixit A., Grossman G.M., and Helpman E. Common agency and coordination: general theory and application to government policy making. Journal of Political Economy 105 (1997) 752-769
14. Felli L., and Merlo A. Endogenous lobbying. Journal of the European Economic Association 4 (2006) 180-215
15. Fisman R., and Gatti R. Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries. Journal of Public Economics 83 (2002) 325-345
16. Grossman G.M., and Helpman E. Protection for sale. American Economic Review 84 (1994) 833-850
17. Grossman G.M., and Helpman E. Special Interest Politics (2001), The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
18. Keen M.J., and Kotsogiannis C. Does federalism lead to excessively high taxes?. American Economic Review 92 (2002) 363-370
19. Lockwood B. Distributive politics and the costs of centralization. Review of Economic Studies 69 (2002) 313-337
20. Mitra D. Endogenous lobbies formation and endogenous protection: a long run model of trade determination. American Economic Review 89 (1999) 1116-1134
21. Oates, W., 1972. Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich.
22. Persson T. Economic policy and special interest politics. Economic Journal 108 (1998) 310-327
23. Persson T., and Tabellini G. Political Economics (2000), The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
24. Prat A., and Rustichini A. Games played through agents. Econometrica 71 (2003) 989-1026
25. Prud'homme R. On the dangers of decentralization. World Bank Policy Research WP vol.1252 (1994)
26. Redoano, M., 2002. Does centralization affect the number and size of lobbies? mimeo.
27. Seabright P. Accountability and decentralization in government: an incomplete contracts model. European Economic Review 40 (1996) 61-89
28. Segal I. Contracting with externalities. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1999) 337-388
29. Spiller P.T., and Liao S. Buy, lobby or sue: Interest groups' participation in policy making - a selective survey. NBER Working Paper vol. 12209 (2006)
30. Tabellini G. Principles of policy making in the European Union: an economic perspective. CESifo Economic Studies 49 (2003) 75-102
31. Tabellini G., and Wyplosz C. Supply-side policy coordination in the European Union. Swedish Economic Policy Review 13 (2006) 101-156
32. Treisman D. The causes of corruption: a cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics 76 (2000) 399-457
33. Treisman D. Fiscal decentralization, governance, and economic performance. Economics and Politics 18 (2006) 219-235
34. Wilson J.D. Theories of tax competition. National Tax Journal 52 (1999) 269-304