Delegation and incentives

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 39, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 664-682

  Bester, Helmut ^a   Krähmer, Daniel ^a  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 54049115948     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00033.x     Document Type: Article

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