On partial contracting

European Economic Review

Volumn 46, Issue 4-5, 2002, Pages 745-753

  Aghion, Philippe ^a,b,c   Dewatripont, Mathias ^c,d   Rey, Patrick ^c,e  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^d UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

^e TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (France)

Author keywords

Contractible control; Nonverifiable actions; Partial contracting; Transferable control

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY;

EID: 0036260751     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00227-6     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting
2. Renegotiation design with unverifiable information
3. Formal and real authority in organizations
4. Reputation and discretion in financial contracting
5. Incomplete contracts, specific investments, and risk-sharing
6. Authority
7. A theory of debt and equity: Diversity of securities and manager-shareholder congruence
8. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration
9. Incomplete contracts and renegotiation
10. Property rights and the nature of the firm
11. Foundations of incomplete contracts
12. Moral hazard and observability
13. Moral hazard in teams
14. Reputation and imperfect information
15. Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality
16. On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts
17. Implementation and renegotiation
18. Unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts
19. Two remarks on the property-rights literature
20. The theory of moral hazard and unobservable behavior
21. Subgame perfect implementation
22. Option contracts and renegotiation: A solution to the hold-up problem
23. Complexity and renegotiation: A foundation for incomplete contracts
24. A theory of credibility
25. Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand?
26. Starting small and renegotiation