Fiscal policy, rent seeking, and growth under electoral uncertainty: Theory and evidence from the OECD

Canadian Journal of Economics

Volumn 41, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 1375-1405

  Angelopoulos, Konstantinos ^a   Economides, George ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

^b ATHENS UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Greece)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC GROWTH; FISCAL POLICY; GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS; GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT; OECD; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL ECONOMY; PUBLIC SPENDING; RENT SEEKING; THEORETICAL STUDY; UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS;

EID: 53349173410     PISSN: 00084085     EISSN: 15405982     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.00508.x     Document Type: Article

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