The persistence of corruption and slow economic growth

IMF Staff Papers

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 1-18

  Mauro, Paolo ^a  

^a INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2642581760     PISSN: 10207635     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (31)

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