Mechanisms for information elicitation

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 172, Issue 16-17, 2008, Pages 1917-1939

  Zohar, Aviv ^a   Rosenschein, Jeffrey S ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Information elicitation; Information trade; Mechanism design

Indexed keywords

IMAGE SEGMENTATION; MECHANISMS; PROBABILITY; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; SET THEORY;

COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS; DESIGN ALGORITHMS; DESIGN PROBLEMS; DISCRETE SETS; EXPONENTIAL-TIME ALGORITHMS; HARD PROBLEMS; INFORMATION ELICITATION; INFORMATION TRADE; MECHANISM DESIGN; PRIVATE INFORMATION; PROPER SCORING RULES; RUNNING TIMES; SCORING RULES;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 52949149332     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2008.08.005     Document Type: Article

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