Mechanism design with partial revelation

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1333-1340

  Hyafil, Nathanaël ^a   Boutilier, Craig ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AUTOMATED DESIGN; DIRECT MECHANISM; DOMINANT STRATEGY; MANIPULABILITY; MECHANISM DESIGN; MULTI-ATTRIBUTES; SOCIAL WELFARE; TRACTABLE ALGORITHMS;

COST ACCOUNTING; MACHINE DESIGN;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 36348980681     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (23)

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