Mechanisms for partial information elicitation: The truth, but not the whole truth

Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 1, Issue , 2006, Pages 734-739

  Zohar, Aviv ^a   Rosenschein, Jeffrey S ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; CUSTOMER SATISFACTION; INTELLIGENT AGENTS; PROBABILITY; PROBLEM SOLVING; PRODUCT DESIGN;

PARTIAL INFORMATION ELICITATION; PROBABILISTIC INFORMATION;

INFORMATION ANALYSIS;

EID: 33750735030     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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