When does the mission determine the coalition? The logic of multilateral intervention and the case of Afghanistan

Security Studies

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 531-567

  Kreps, Sarah ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 52449087191     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: 15561852     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636410802319610     Document Type: Article

References (177)

1. See Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's press conference of 18 October 2001, available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0110/ 18/se.23.html.
2. UNSC Resolution 1368.
3. See Rumsfeld interview with Chicago Sun-Times editorial board, 16 November 2001; http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t11212001 t1116sun.html.
4. Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
5. Benjamin Miller, "The Logic of U.S. Military Interventions in the post-Cold War Era," Contemporary Security Policy 19, no.3 (December 1998): 72-109.
6. Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, 80-82.
7. See President George W. Bush press conference, Museum of Science and Industry, 7 July 2006, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2006/07/20060707-1.html.
8. For more on "controlled comparison" and the value of within-case variation, see Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 32-33, 80-81.
9. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, quoted in Ronald Rogowski, "The Role of Theory and Anomaly in Social-Scientific Inference," The American Political Science Review 89, no. 2 (June 1995): 467-70; 468.
10. Rogowski, who argues in his critique of King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) that analyzing a few cases meticulously may offer valuable insights and therefore urges a more liberal reading of King, Keohane, and Verba's critiques.
11. Robert O. Keohane, "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research," International Journal 45 (Autumn 1990): 731-64.
12. John Ruggie, "Multilateralism: Anatomy of an Institution," International Organization 46 (Summer 1992): 561-98;
13. Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention.
14. This conceptualization borrows from Sarah Kreps, "Multilateral Military Interventions: Theory and Practice," Political Science Quarterly (forthcoming).
15. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, "The Rational Design of International Institutions," International Organization 55, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): 792.
16. This logic follows a basic realist assumption that institutional decision making is a function of power and interest distributions among parties. A coalition in which U.S. power is overwhelmingly asymmetric or in which U.S. assets overwhelmingly dominates, as in Iraq, means that the United States will have a monopoly on decision making, which would make such a coalition effectively unilateral even if in name it is multilateral.
17. Sarah Kreps, "The 1994 Haiti Intervention: Unilateralism in Multilateral Clothes," The Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 3 (June 2007): 449-74.
18. See for example, Alex Thompson, "Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission," International Organization 61, no.1 (Winter 2006): 1-34.
19. See, inter alia, James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13 no. 2 (June 1969): 149-71;
20. Bruce W. Jentleson, Ariel Levite, and Larry Berman, Foreign Military Intervention (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1994);
21. Frederic S. Pearson, "Foreign Military Interventions and Domestic Disputes," International Studies Quarterly 18, no. 3 (September 1974): 259-90;
22. and Andrea Kathryn Talentino, Military Intervention after the Cold War: The Evolution of Theory and Practice (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2006).
23. James March and Johan Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders," International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 943-69, especially the logic of institutions as spelled out on 949-53. March and Olsen address two sets of behavioral logics, including consequences and appropriateness.
24. March and Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics," 950.
25. Miller, "The Logic of U.S. Military Interventions."
26. Ibid.
27. March and Olsen, "The Institutional Dynamics," 949-953.
28. Theo Farrell, The Norms ofWar: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 1. This shared expectation of multilateralism fits Farrell's definition of norms as "beliefs shared by a community about who they are, what the world is like, and given these two things, what they can and should do in given circumstances."
29. Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, 80.
30. Ibid., 82.
31. Ibid.
32. Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention, 134.
33. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 887-917; 891. They outline these concepts of norms, "oughtness" and "appropriateness."
34. See, for example, The Economist, "Supply Side Peacekeeping," 21 February 2007;
35. or Colum Lynch, "UN Votes 2,100 More Troops for Congo Force," Washington Post, 29 July 2003, A12.
36. Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 1 (January/February 1996).
37. John Gerring and Jason Seawright, "Case-Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options," Political Research Quarterly (forthcoming).
38. Andrew Bennett writes that "in a least-likely case, the independent variable is at a level that gives only a weak prediction; a finding that it nonetheless produces the outcome is strong supporting evidence." From Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79-137;
39. for application of this most likely/least likely distinction, see Andrew Bennett et al., "Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War," International Organization 48, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 39-75.
40. David Malone, "Uncle Sam's Coalition of One," The Globe and Mail, 13 December 2001, A25.
41. In his book on Afghanistan, Anthony Cordesman has a chapter entitled "The 'Conventional Phase' of the Conflict: Drawing Lessons Without Hard Data," referring to the degree to which information has remained unclassified with respect to SOF in Afghanistan.
42. See Anthony Cordesman, The Ongoing Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation, and Nation Building (Washington, DC: CSIS Publications, 2004), 24-33.
43. Richard W. Stewart, The United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2004).
44. Quoted in Alan Sipress and Peter Finn, "U.S. Says 'Not Yet' to Patrol by Allies," Washington Post, 30 November 2001.
45. Woodward, Bush at War, 179-80.
46. Alan Sipress and Peter Finn, "U.S. Says 'Not Yet' to Patrol by Allies," Washington Post, 30 November 2001.
47. Quoted in Nora Bensahel, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2003), 7-8. Bensahel's treatment covers coalition cooperation in Afghanistan and Operation Enduring Freedom more broadly.
48. Judy Dempsey and Alexander Nicoll, "NATO Leaders Warm to U.S. Flexibility," Financial Times, 27 September 2001, 6.
49. Paul Wolfowitz speech available at http://www.nato.int/multi/audio/2001/ 010926d.mp3.
50. Michael Evans, "Coalition Troops Set for Covert Action," London Times, 22 September 2001.
51. See General James L. Jones, "Prague to Istanbul: Ambition versus Reality," speech at the Center for Strategic Decision Research, available at http://www.csdr.org/2004book/Gen_Jones.htm.
52. A national caveat is "generally a formal written restriction that most nations place on the use of their forces." Jones, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, has said that "collectively, these restrictions limit the tactical commanders' operational flexibility."
53. Michael Gordon, "Britain Allots Troops for Afghan Ground Combat, and Australia is Contributing, Too," New York Times, 27 October 2001.
54. Gordon, "Britain Allots Troops for Afghan Ground Combat."
55. Gary Bernsten, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda : A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander (Westminster, MD: Crown Publishing, 2005), 210.
56. T. R. Reid, "Blair Denies Split with Bush over War," Washington Post, 22 November 2001, A36;
57. and Warren Hoge, "British Defense Secretary Says Troops for Afghanistan are Being Taken off High Alert," New York Times, 27 November 2001, 4.
58. David Wastell, "How 680 Paras drove a wedge between London and Washington," Sunday Telegraph, 25 November 2001, 20.
59. Michael Gordon, "U.S. and Britain at Odds Over Use and Timing of Peacekeeping Troops," New York Times, 2 December 2001;
60. see also Michael Gordon, "Afghans Block Britain's Plan for Big Force," New York Times, 20 November 2001, B1 in which he quotes a Pentagon official who doubts that there will at any point be some role for British and French forces in northern Afghanistan's operations.
61. Sipress and Finn, "U.S. Says 'Not Yet."'
62. Paul Koring, "Foreign Troops Ready to Set Up Afghan Bases," The Globe and Mail, 22 November 2001, A7.
63. Ann Scott Tyson, "U.S., Allies in a Riskier Kind of War," Christian Science Monitor, 5 March 2002, 1;
64. "The Grand Global Coalition," The Christian Science Monitor, 6 March 2002, 8;
65. Tim Naumetz, David Pugliese and Hilary Mackenzie, "JTF2 Locked in Fierce Afghan Fight," The Ottawa Citizen, 5 March 2002, A1;
66. and Peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser, "U.S., Allied Forces Patrol Battle Zone," Washington Post, 15 March 2002, A14.
67. Personal correspondence with twenty-four year Army SOF officer, Dr. Kalev Sepp, Naval Postgraduate School, 14 June 2007.
68. Chip Cummins and Jeanne Cummings, "U.S. Reliance on Northern Rebels may Dilute Support from Pakistan," Wall Street Journal, 30 October 2001, A4.
69. Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future ofWarfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 24.
70. Charles H. Briscoe, Richard Kiper, James A. Schroder, Kalev I. Sepp, Weapon of Choice: Army Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan (Ft. Leavenworth, CGSC Press, 2004).
71. "The Limits of Intervention," The Independent, 23 December 2001, 16.
72. By alliances, I refer less to formal alliance behavior but rather alignment behavior, which includes ad hoc alliances or coalitions that coalesce around a particular political and strategic objective and dissolve after that objective is reached. In this dissertation, I refer to alliance and alignment interchangeably, with the goal of explaining incentives behind decisions to see allies in more fluid circumstances rather than the more rigid alliance structures that seem largely anachronistic.
73. Kenneth Waltz, The Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 168.
74. Ibid., 143-46.
75. For definitions of military operations phases, see Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York, NY: Regan Books, 2004).
76. Monica Duffy Toft, "Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War," Security Studies 15, no. 1 (January-March 2006): 34-69, esp. 51-57. In her work on the likelihood of violence, Toft roughly equates time horizon with the degree to which a state discounts the future. My argument implies a similar logical equivalence.
77. James Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and Cooperation," International Organization 52, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 269-305, 274, 277. He notes that bargaining can involve costly delays.
78. See the U.S. Army War College Campaign Planning Primer, 8d, Combined Forces Organization.
79. Stephen Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997), 445-77, spec. 450.
80. The discount rate refers to the degree to which actors discount the future, "favoring short-term military preparedness over longer-term objectives when they conflict; states often make intertemporal trade-offs." For the security application of discount rate, see Stephen Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization 51 no. 3 (Summer 1997): 445-77, spec. 450.
81. Ibid. This logic, which correlates the way a state values future versus present priorities with the degree to which its security interests are threatened, follows closely from that of Brooks.
82. Ibid.
83. G. John Ikenberry, "Distant Gains: When do States Make Choices for the Long Term?" Browne Center for International Politics, working paper, July 1997.
84. Bruce Russett and Miles Lackey, "In the Shadow of the Cloud: If There's no Tomorrow, Why Save Today?" Political Science Quarterly 102, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 259-72.
85. Jack Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics 40, no. 1 (October 1987): 82-107.
86. See Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International Security 20, no. 2 (Autumn 1995): 5-34.
87. Dafna Linzer, "Iran is Judged 10 Years from Nuclear Bomb," Washington Post, 2 August 2005, A01.
88. Barry Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony," International Security 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003), 5-46.
89. Woodward, Bush At War, 285.
90. Michael Gordon, "Bush's Aims: Deter Attack, Send a Signal," New York Times, 8 August 1990, A1."
91. The army also had almost 500,000 in the Army National Guard and 300,000 in the Army Reserve, bringing the total force up to about 1.6 million, but half of this total were soldiers that would have to be activated and were less immediately available. For force structure comparisons between the Cold War and the 1990s, see "A Changed Army," available at http://www.army.mil/aps/98/chapter2.htm.
92. Indeed, the United States unilaterally deployed a deterrence force of about 200,000 to address the immediate threat that Iraq could invade Saudi Arabia in 1990. The Gulf War is actually more phased than its typical casting as a multilateral operation would suggest. The initial deployments to deal with the immediate threat were unilateral, and the latter deployments were multilateral because of the expectation of a high cost in the operational phases.
93. This is likely to be a fair assumption both because up-front cooperation costs include a steep learning curve for each new coalition operation and because of the difficulty of interoperability in the combat versus post-combat phase of operations.
94. Robert Samuelson defines an "opportunity cost" as the "foregone opportunities that have been sacrificed." A more economics-based definition is that an opportunity cost if "the maximum alternative earning that might have been obtained if a productive good, service, or capacity had been applied to some alternative use."
95. For these definitions, see Wayne E. Leininger, "Opportunity Costs: Some Definitions and Examples," The Accounting Review, vol. L11.1 (January 1977): 248-51.
96. An example of a quick "in and out" mission would be Panama, where the United States was going in quickly to retrieve Manuel Noriega but had no intentions of remaining and building a new, democratic regime.
97. An example here might be Operation Urgent Fury, in which the United States intervened in Grenada responding to a coup d'etat. Once it had overthrown the old government and waited for a new government to take over, U.S. forces left; helping the new government build institutions and maintain stability was never contemplated.
98. Personal correspondence with Lt. Col. Ike Wilson, 20 February 2007.
99. Michael Gordon, "A Prewar Slide Show Cast Iraq in Rosy Hues," New York Times, 15 February 2007.
100. David Lake, Entangling Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 41.
101. See ibid., chaps. 1-3. These assumptions are drawn from those that Lake applies in his framework of unilateralism and joint production economies (a framework that considers conditions likely to lead to unilateral or multilateral outcomes).
102. Lake, Entangling Relations, 42.
103. Ibid.
104. Personal interview with Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman, 17 January 2007.
105. A representative political view on the issue of using force in Iraq is that of Senator Hillary Clinton, who favored obtaining UN authorization but cautioned that some UN members might not authorize force until Saddam Hussein had "actually used chemical, biological, or God forbid, nuclear weapons" and that Saddam should "disarm or be disarmed."
106. See Senator Hillary Clinton, speech on the floor of the Senate, 10 October 2002; available at http://clinton.senate.gov/speeches/iraq 101002.html.
107. Those attacks include the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the 1995 Khobar Towers bombing, the 1998 Embassy bombing, and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole.
108. For more on U.S. risk aversion before 9/11, see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2004).
109. See "Statement of Cofer Black: Joint Investigation into September 11," 5th Public Hearing, 26 September 2002, Joint House/Senate Intelligence Committee Hearing.
110. Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976). In his well-known discussion of how states perceive their threats, Jervis hypotheses that information that percolates in is less likely to shift perceptions than information that emerges in large doses. For U.S. decision makers, the smaller terrorist attacks of the 1990s did little to shift threat perceptions compared to the more dramatic attacks of 9/ 11, which drastically shifted the mindset about threats.
111. See "Testimony of Richard A. Clarke before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States," 24 March 2004, available at http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/clarke statement.pdf
112. See the 2002 National Security Strategy, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf, 15
113. and Ron Suskind, The One-Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2006). Suskind refers to the administration's approach - which required less certainty on threats before acting - as the "one percent doctrine" in the eponymous book.
114. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms."
115. Dick Cheney, quoted in Woodward, Bush At War, 291.
116. See Campaign Planning Primer 2006, Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, the U.S. Army War College.
117. For more on some of the interagency challenges, see Woodward, Bush At War, 126-70; 136.
118. Author's interview with lead CENTCOM planner, Col. John Agoglia, 17 April 2007.
119. See Milan Vego, "What Can We Learn from Enduring Freedom?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 128, no. 7 (July 2002): 28-33.
120. David C. Gompert and Uwe Nerlich, Shoulder to Shoulder: The Road to US-European Military Cooperability: A German-American Analysis (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 2002).
121. See Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America (New York: Random House, 2003), 295
122. Personal interview with U.S. Army special forces officer, Kalev Sepp, 12 June 2007.
123. Seymour Hersh, "The Other War: Why Bush's Afghanistan Won't Go Away," New Yorker, 12 April 2002.
124. For an excellent discussion on the basis and employment of the Afghan Model, see Richard B. Andres, Craig Wills, and Thomas E. Griffith, "Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model"
125. and Stephen Biddle, "Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq"in "The Afghan Model and Its Limits," International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/06).
126. Thomas Ricks, "War Plan for Iraq is Ready, Say Officials," Washington Post, 10 November 2002.
127. Personal interview with Lt. Col Michael Fleck, Deputy Chief, Programs and Legislative Division, 20 September 2006.
128. For a full account of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) operations in Afghanistan, see Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002), 8.
129. Woodward, quoted in Richard B. Andres, Craig Wills, and Thomas E. Griffith Jr, "Winning with Allies," International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006): 124-60; 131.
130. Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Richard Myers, and Secretary of Defense, Don Rumsfeld in press conference on 8 October 2001.
131. Barton Gellman, "Secret Unit Expands Rumsfeld's Domain," Washington Post, 23 January 2005, A01.
132. Andres et al., "Winning with Allies."
133. This estimate is based on United States Special Operations Command's 2006 Posture, which notes that the 2006 totals of 52,846 represent a 1,400 person increase from 2005 and a 1,500 increase from 2004; though the rates of growth for 2002 and 2003 are not included, they cannot exceed 1,500 because the post-9/11 increase in SOF training did not begin bearing results until a year or two into recruiting and training. Nonetheless, a conservative estimate for 2001 (fiscal year 2002) would therefore be about 46,846.
134. That amounts to about 4% of the SOF totals compared to about 12% of the total Army and Marine forces that have been involved in Iraq over a period of 4 years. While the 12% has certainly stretched the forces, these two services have nonetheless found ways to keep combat brigades rotating through.
135. See Congressional Budget Office, Some Implications of Increasing U.S. Forces in Iraq, April 2007, available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/ 80xx/doc8024/04-24-Iraq.pdf, accessed on 18 July 2007.
136. For more on the Operational Detachment Alpha structure and the early months of Afghanistan, see Max Boot, "Special Forces and Horses," Armed Forces Journal (November 2006).
137. "JTF2: Canada's Super-Secret Commandos," Canadian Broadcast Corporation, 15 July 2005;
138. and Warren Hoge, "Britain Sends 1,700 Troops to Afghan Fight, New York Times, 19 March 2002.
139. Bryan Bender and Ellen Barry, "U.S. Troops on Ground in Afghanistan; Rumsfeld Says Effort Aiding Rebel Forces," Boston Globe, 31 October 2001, A1.
140. As Anthony Cordesman points out, some of the reliance on the Northern Alliance was merely accidental, the result of being unable to deploy large numbers of mountain-capable special forces troops in a relatively short amount of time. See The Ongoing Lessons of Afghanistan:WArfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation, and Nation Building, CSIS Publications, 18.
141. See also O'Hanlon, "Flawed Masterpiece."
142. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom (Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 2006), 60.
143. For more on the objective to minimize collateral damage with an eye toward reconstruction, see also Thomas E. Ricks and Alan Sipress, "Attacks Restrained by Political Goals," Washington Post, 23 October 2001, A01.
144. See Steven A. Holmes, "Gore Assails Bush on Plan to Recall U.S. Balkan Force," New York Times, 22 October 2000, 1.
145. Personal correspondence with Army historian, Conrad Crane, 14 June 2007.
146. Woodward, Bush At War, 275-6.
147. The first sign that the United States was looking at building a new government in Afghanistan was the appointment of James Dobbins as a special envoy to opposition parties in Afghanistan in November 2001. Dobbins deployed to central Asia in November 2001 to begin negotiating the transitional government, the earliest evidence that the United States was considering the political objectives associated with OEF.
148. See, for example, "Dobbins Named U.S. Envoy to Opposition in Afghanistan," Washington Post, 6 November 2001, A14;
149. and Robert D. McFadden, "Seeking a Kabul Coalition," New York Times, B1.
150. Dr. Conrad Crane's presentation at "U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation," 2 November 2005, held at the School of Advanced International Studies (rapporteur's notes). Phase IV refers to postconflict operations, which includes transition back to peace and civilian government control.
151. See Conrad C. Crane, "Phase IV Operations: Where Wars Are Really Won," Military Review, May-June 2005, 27-36. Lt. Col. Isaiah Wilson confirms that there was "no original Phase IV planning of any kind" in Afghanistan.
152. See "Defeating the Regime and Occupying Iraq," in War in Iraq, eds., Thomas Keaney and Tom Mahnken (London: Routledge, 2007). This view was confirmed through interviews with key CENTCOM planners conducted between March and June 2007.
153. Internal Army War College memo, quoted in Thomas Ricks, Fiasco, 70.
154. "Franks Vows: 'No U.S. Occupying Force in Afghanistan,"' available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44355.
155. See NATO's International Security Assistance Force fact sheet, available at http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isafplacemat.pdf; and Cindy Saine, "U.S. to Send More Combat Troops to Afghanistan Next Year," Voice of America, 4 April 2008. According to this data, the United States has 19,000 troops participating in ISAF, which is about 40% of the total, but it also has about 10,000 participating in a command outside ISAF. Thus, the United States has about 31,000 of the 59,000 total troops (about 52%) in Afghanistan.
156. Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2006). Rothstein makes a similar argument about the two phases of the Afghanistan campaign.
157. See NATO in Afghanistan, http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/ 040628-factsheet.htm.
158. See speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 20 July 2006, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060720d.htm.
159. As of early 2007, about 14,000 Americans participated under NATO-ISAF; another 11,000 continued participating in counterterrorism operations and police training. See Carlotta Gall, "American Takes over Command of NATO Force in Afghanistan," New York Times, 5 February 2007.
160. Lt. Col. Conrad Crane, "Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won," Military Review (May- June 2005): 27-36. He makes a similar argument about the possible overlap between Phases III and IV.
161. For more on the operational distinctions between the counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations, see Lt. Gen. Ethem Erdagi, "The ISAF Mission and Turkey's Role in Rebuilding the Afghan State," Policy Watch #1052, Special Forum for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 18 November 2005; available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2403.
162. Richard Haass, testimony to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, quoted in Jonathan Wright, "U.S. Outlines Limited Role in Rebuilding," The Houston Chronicle (Reuters), 7 December 2001.
163. "Marines Enter Kandahar Airport," available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44361.
164. Admiral Gregory G. Johnson, "Examining the SFOR experience," NATO Review (Winter 2004).
165. "Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan Campaign Assessment," Center for Peace and Security Studies seminar at Georgetown University, 21 September 2006.
166. Gen. James L. Jones, Jr, "From Coalition to ISAF Command in Afghanistan: The Purpose and Impact of the Transition," Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 21 September 2006, 109th Cong., 2d sess.
167. Personal interview with Rian Harris, the Economic Officer (Commercial Section) in the U.S. Embassy, Kabul Afghanistan between September 2005-August 2006, (11 September 2006).
168. See "UN Military, Police Deployment Reaches All-Time High in October," available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/ pko152.doc.htm.
169. See White House's Operation Enduring Freedom Overview, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011001-10.html.
170. The Global War on Terror, the First 100 Days, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/100dayreport.html.
171. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks news briefing, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/ transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2465.
172. Finnemore, The Purpose of Invention, 134. For more on the discussion about whether the United States would seek UN authorization explicitly for combat operations in Afghanistan,
173. see Anne Penketh, " Annan: UN Must have Role in Fight against Terrorism," The Independent, 25 September 2001, 5.
174. Barry McCaffrey, testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 28 February 1993, 103rd Cong., 2d sess.
175. See 2002 National Intelligence Estimate; declassified portions available at the National Security Archive.
176. See declassified CENTCOM's POLO STEP slides that showed a troop presence of only 6,000 troops by the end of 2006; available at The National Security Archive.
177. For more on "self-help" under conditions of anarchy, see Kenneth Waltz, The Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Humanities, 1979).