Winning with allies - The strategic value of the Afghan model

International Security

Volumn 30, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 124-160

  Andres, Richard B ^a   Wills, Craig ^b   Griffith Jr , Thomas E ^a  

^a School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS)

^b USAF   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645743038     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016228805775969591     Document Type: Review

References (227)

1. For work on this subject, see, for instance, John M. Newman, JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power (New York: Warner, 1992), p. 160;
2. and William Rosenau, Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001).
3. Bob Woodward records the NSC principals' astonishment on November 12, 2001, to news of the Northern Alliance's unexpected success. See Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), particularly p. 306.
4. William D. Dries, "Future Counterland Operations: Common Lessons from Three Conflicts," master's thesis, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 2003, p. 19.
5. Amy Belasco, The Cost of Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Enhanced Security (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2005), pp. 1-4.
6. Statistical Information Analysis Division, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense, http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/ casualty/OIF-Total.pdf (accessed December 8, 2005);
7. and Statistical Information Analysis Division, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense, http://www.dior.whs. mil/mmid/casualty/WOTSUM.PDF (accessed December 8, 2005). Hostile deaths include killed in action, died of wounds, died while missing in action, and died while captured. Nonhostile deaths are categorized as accident, illness, homicide, self-inflicted, undetermined, and pending final determination.
8. "Secretary-General Report to the UN Security Council on the Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security," March 18, 2005.
9. As of late 2005, there were about 140,000 U.S. troops in Iraq and only about 20,000 in Afghanistan. See "U.S. Forces Order of Battle," http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat.htm.
10. Quoted in Eric Schmitt and James Dao, "Use of Air Power Comes of Age in New War," New York Times, December 24, 2001;
11. and Milan Vego, "What Can We Learn from Enduring Freedom?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 128, No. 7 (July 2002), pp. 28-33.
12. Stephen Biddle, "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 2 (March/April 2003), p. 31.
13. For a more detailed explanation of this argument, see Stephen Biddle, Special Forces and the Future of Warfare: Will SOF Predominate in 2020? (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004), p. 14;
14. and Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002).
15. Biddle, Special Forces and the Future of Warfare, p. 17.
16. For a theoretical explication of this argument, see Stephen Biddle, "The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare," Security Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Autumn 1998), pp. 1-74, especially pp. 24-26;
17. and Conrad C. Crane, The U.S. Army's Initial Impressions of Operations Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002).
18. Michael E. O'Hanlon, "A Flawed Masterpiece," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May/June 2002), pp. 54-57.
19. For detailed historical accounts, see Philip Smucker, Al Qaeda's Great Escape: The Military and the Media on Terror's Trail (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2004);
20. Susan B. Glasser, "The Battle of Tora Bora: Secrets, Money, Mistrust," Washington Post, February 10, 2002;
21. John Donnelly, "Fighting Terror/The Military Campaign; How U.S. Strategy in Tora Bora Failed, Deals by Afghan Allies May Have Let al Qaeda Leaders Escape," Boston Globe, February 10, 2002;
22. Martin Arostegui, "The Search for bin Laden," Insight Magazine, August 12, 2002, http://www.insightmag.com/news/2002/09/02/World/Special. Reportthe.Search.For.Osama.Bin.Laden-260506.shtml;
23. and Benjamin Lambeth, Air Power against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, MG-166 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2005).
24. William R. Hawkins, "What Not to Learn from Afghanistan," Parameters, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 24-32, especially p. 31;
25. Doug Mason, "A New American Way of War? Identifying Operational Lessons from American Involvement in Southwest Asia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan" (Newport, R.I.: Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, February 2002), p. 11;
26. John Hendren, "Afghanistan Yields Lessons for Pentagon's Next Targets," Los Angeles Times, January 21, 2002;
27. Michael Gordon, "One War, Differing Aims," New York Times, December 18, 2001;
28. Michael R. Lwin, "Coherent Joint Warfare Is Our Silver Bullet," Proceedings, Vol. 129, No. 10 (October 2003), pp. 56-59;
29. Timothy R. Reese, "Precision Firepower: Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy," Military Review, Vol. 83, No. 4 (July-August 2003), pp. 46-53, 48;
30. and Max Boot, "The New American Way of War," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 4 (July/August 2003), pp. 41-58.
31. For more information on these names, see Boot, "The New American Way of War";
32. and Biddle, "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare."
33. Paul L. Hastert, "Operation Anaconda: Perception Meets Reality in the Hills of Afghanistan," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January 2005), p. 11;
34. Bryan Bender, Kim Burger, and Andrew Koch, "Afghanistan: First Lessons," Jane's Defence Weekly, December 19, 2001;
35. Ann Scott Tyson, "U.S. Is Prevailing with Its Most Finely Tuned War," Christian Science Monitor, November 21,2001;
36. Paul Watson and Richard Cooper, "Blended Tactics Paved Way for Sudden Collapse," Los Angeles Times, November 15, 2001;
37. Michael Gordon, "'New' U.S. War: Commandos, Airstrikes, and Allies on the Ground," New York Times, December 29, 2001;
38. Thom Shanker, "Conduct of War Is Redefined by Success of Special Forces," New York Times, January 21, 2002;
39. Hendren, "Afghanistan Yields Lessons for Pentagon's Next Targets," p. 1;
40. and Joseph Fitchett, "Swift Success for High-Tech Arms," International Herald Tribune, December 7, 2001.
41. Biddle argues that the "real causes of battlefield success have been surprisingly stable since 1917-1918"; he goes on to say that "expectations of a looming revolution in military affairs are both a serious misreading of modern military history and a dangerous prescription for today's defense policy: they could easily lead to an overemphasis on new technology or radical operational concepts that could weaken, not strengthen, the American military and undermine its ability to prevail on future battlefields."
42. Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. ix.
43. For an opposing view, see John A. Warden III, "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," in Richard H. Schultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., eds., The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War (Maxwell Air Force Base [AFB], Ala.: Air University Press, 1992), pp. 57-83.
44. Benjamin S. Lambeth argues that the rhetoric surrounding the debate has masked the real issue: how new technologies are changing the use of air assets in ground operations. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000).
45. See also Tony Mason, Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1994);
46. and Robert A. Pape, "The True Worth of Airpower," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 2 (March/April 2004), pp. 116-130.
47. See Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power;
48. Daryl G. Press, "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 5-44;
49. Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139-179;
50. Stephen Biddle, "Assessing Theories of Future Warfare," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 29, 1997;
51. James R. Blaker, "Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Guide to America's 21st Century Defense," working paper no. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Progressive Policy Institute, January 1997);
52. Michael G. Vickers, "Warfare in 2020: A Primer" (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996);
53. Biddle, "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare," p. 3;
54. Hunter Keeter, "Anti-terror Campaign Could Speed Military Transformation," Defense Daily, November 21, 2001, p. 4;
55. and Michael Vickers, "The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the FY 2003 Defense Budget Request, and the Way Ahead for Transformation: Meeting the 'Rumsfeld Test'" (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, June 19, 2002).
56. Investigators quickly established that the attacks had been carried out by members of al-Qaida.
57. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 291.
58. An early version of the plan, sometimes dubbed the standard "forty-eight months and five divisions," is described in Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War against America (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 295.
59. The CIA had carefully cultivated contacts with Afghan rebels in the preceding years. In the months before September 11, the agency had proposed increasing aid to the Northern Alliance in hopes of deposing the Taliban. Gary C. Schroen offers perhaps the best account of the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom. Schroen, First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan (New York: Ballantine, 2005).
60. See also Woodward, Bush at War. For a wider political view of the U.S. government's thinking on methods of dealing with terrorists in Afghanistan,
61. see Benjamin and Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 326-349.
62. SOF and airpower saw extensive use during World War II. In the European and Mediterranean theaters, aircraft inserted and extracted intelligence agents on clandestine missions and dropped supplies to resistance fighters. Robert Jackson, The Secret Squadrons (London: Robson, 1983), pp. 112-119;
63. Bernard V. Moore II, "'The Secret Air War over France: USAAF Special Operations Units in the French Campaign of 1944," master's thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1992. In the Pacific theater, an air unit was established to transport and supply specialized infantry units working behind the Japanese lines in Burma. Airmen also flew fighter and bomber missions, providing the ground forces with added firepower.
64. Philip D. Chinnery, Any Time, Any Place: Fifty Years of the USAF Air Commandos and Special Operations Forces, 1944-1994 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994), pp. 14-59;
65. and David M. Sullivan, "From Burma to Baghdad: Enhancing the Synergy between Land-Based Special Forces and Combat Air Operations," master's thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, 2003, pp. 28-34.
66. Initial plans called for large-scale operations using thousands of recruited Laotian tribesmen, but political considerations restricted the missions to small teams. Rosenau, Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets;
67. Sullivan, "From Burma to Baghdad," pp. 47-56;
68. John L. Plaster, SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997);
69. and United States Air Force, Kenneth Sams, USAF Support of Special Forces in SEA (S.I.: 5.n., March 10, 1969).
70. Evidence of this pressure was visible in an NSC meeting ten days after the attacks, when President Bush noted, "We've got to start showing results." Quoted in Woodward, Bush at War, p. 113.
71. Col. Mark Rosengard, director of operations, Task Force Dagger, interview by Maj. Mark Davis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, February 27, 2004.
72. Vego, "What Can We Learn from Enduring Freedom?"
73. Woodward, Bush at War, pp. 82, 131, 182, 193.
74. Afghanistan has long been the bane of invading armies; Alexander the Great struggled there, and Britain's attempts to subdue the region failed miserably. See Milton Bearden, "Afghanistan: Graveyard of Empires," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 6 (November/December 2001), pp. 13-30.
75. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 193.
76. Bin Laden's scorn for U.S. airpower appears in numerous speeches, particularly after the unsuccessful cruise missile attack on al-Qaida's Afghan training camps following the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. See, for instance, "Exclusive Interview: Conversation with Terror," Time Asia, September 14, 2001, http://www.time.com/time/asia/news/ interview/0,9754,174550,00.html.
77. See, for instance, Michael A. Lev, "Pakistan Quells Anti-U.S. Protests," Chicago Tribune, October 9, 2001;
78. and "Protests Rock Pakistan," Guardian Unlimited, September 21, 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/wtccrash/story/0,1300,555779,00.html.
79. Woodward relates some of the conversations between NSC principals regarding this problem. Woodward, Bush at War, pp. 58-59, 82, 123, 173.
80. For an analysis of al-Qaida's strategy taken from bin Laden's speeches before and during Operation Enduring Freedom, see Ronald E. Zimmerman, "Strategic Provocation: Explaining Terrorist Attacks on America," master's thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, 2002.
81. The strategy was first clearly articulated by bin Laden in a speech in August 1996. "Osama bin Laden vs. the U.S.: Edicts and Statements," Frontline, April 1995, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/ who/edicts.html.
82. Zimmerman, "Strategic Provocation."
83. For a comprehensive account of CIA operations in Afghanistan in the wake of the September 11 attacks, see Schroen, First In.
84. For more on this debate, see Woodward, Bush at War, pp. 266, 280.
85. Dries, "Future Counterland Operations," p. 19.
86. Col. Tom Ehrhard, chief of the Strategy Division at the Combined Air Operations Center during Operation Enduring Freedom, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, interview, April 4, 2005.
87. Biddle, "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare."
88. Ehrhard, interview.
89. At an NSC meeting on October 15, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argued that the main problem in the Shamali plains was finding the enemy. In Mazar and Konduz, the enemy was located, but how well their entrenchments worked before SOF designators arrived is an open question. Throughout October, air assets did not concentrate much effort on the entrenched Taliban, Arab, and Pakistani volunteer forces arrayed in these areas. Woodward, Bush at War, pp. 240, 264.
90. Robert Pape, "The Wrong Battle Plan," Washington Post, October 19, 2001.
91. Peter Beaumont, Kamal Ahmed, Ed Vulliamy, Jason Burke, Chris Stephen, Tim Judah, and Paul Harris, "The Rout of the Taliban," Observer Special Reports, November 18, 2001, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0, 1501,596923,00.html.
92. See R.W. Apple Jr., "A Military Quagmire Remembered: Afghanistan as Vietnam," New York Times, October 31, 2001.
93. Ahmed Rashid, "Inside the Taliban," Far Eastern Economic. Review, October 28, 2001, p. 21.
94. John A. Bonin, "The First Year: U.S. Army Forces Central Command during Operation Enduring Freedom," case study (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 2002), p. 30.
95. John A. Bonin, "The First Year: U.S. Army Forces Central Command during Operation Enduring Freedom," (2002), p. 30. Ibid.
96. For a detailed account, see Schroen, First In.
97. Thomas E. Ricks and Doug Struck, "U.S. Troops Coordinating Airstrikes," Washington Post, October 31, 2001.
98. Andrew J. Birtle, "Afghan War Chronology," information paper (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, March 22, 2002), p. 8.
99. The level of analysis in examining the Afghan model is important. Biddle's work on the subject examines the tactical level and, consequently, overlooks the synergy between airpower and ground forces that is at the heart of the model. On why he examines the tactical level, see Biddle, "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare," p. 25, particularly n. 59.
100. For a breakdown of other goals in conventional war, see John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), chaps. 2, 6.
101. See B.H. Liddell Hart, The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart, Vol. 1 (London: Cassell and Company, 1965), pp. 41-49;
102. and Biddle, Military Power, p. 41.
103. For more detailed theoretical analyses of tactics, see Hart, The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart, Vol. 1;
104. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence;
105. and Biddle, Military Power, chap. 3.
106. Biddle, Military Power, pp. 36-37.
107. For detailed explanations of the importance of communications, intelligence, and mobility for defenders, see Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, p. 26;
108. and Biddle, Military Power, p. 32.
109. See, for example, Paul Kennedy, "Britain in the First World War," in Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 1 (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988).
110. Artillery tactics are based on an acknowledgment of this limitation and generally aim to suppress rather than destroy entrenched enemies.
111. Maj. Anton Cihak, U.S. Air Force bomber pilot who planned and flew missions in Operation Enduring Freedom, interview, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, November 20, 2004.
112. The Taliban had deployed its forces throughout the small towns around Mazar-e-Sharif and their environs.
113. Wahid Ahmed, a captured Taliban soldier described the situation on the ground: "We couldn't gather in large groups because that made us a target. We were waiting for our comrades to tell us what to do, but there was nothing to do but hide." S.Sgt. Jason L. Haag, "OIF Veterans Discuss Lessons," Air Force Link, July 31, 2003, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp? storyID?123005347.
114. Anthony Davis, "How the Afghan War Was Won," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 (February 2002), pp. 8, 11, at p. 11;
115. and Ehrhard, interview.
116. Ehrhard, interview.
117. Ibid.
118. Biddle provides an account of how this worked in one battle: "At Tarin Kowt on November 18... Taliban forces tried to recapture the village by advancing in a column of vehicles up an exposed road. Frightened AMF [Afghan military forces]... defenders were prepared to abandon the village, but precision air strikes called in by American commandos located on an overlooking ridgeline decimated the Taliban column, whose survivors fled the scene in disorder. Taliban reserves ordered forward to reinforce their defenses at Bai Beche were caught moving in the open... and were slaughtered by American airpower; officers who surveyed the scene afterward said it brought to mind the infamous 'Highway of Death' leading out of Kuwait City in the 1991 Persian Gulf War."
119. Biddle, "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare," p. 34.
120. See also Alastair Finlan, "Warfare by Other Means: Special Forces, Terrorism, and Grand Strategy," Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 100-101.
121. M.Sgt. Bart Decker, correspondence with the authors, January 15, 2004.
122. Don Chipman, "Air Power and the Battle for Mazar-e Sharif," Air Power History, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring 2003), pp. 34-45. The campaign for Mazar-e-Sharif consisted of several engagements, so calculating the force ratio is difficult. The numbers above reflect the forces involved during the final advance on the city. While the numbers are likely low on both sides, the percentages are likely accurate.
123. Don Chipman, Air Power History, Ibid., p. 38.
124. Dale Andrade, "The Battle for Mazar-e-Sharif, October-November 2001," information paper (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 2002), p. 4.
125. Col. Tom Entwistle, "Operation Enduring Freedom Preliminary Lessons," Task Force Enduring Look briefing, chart 22, October 2002.
126. Exposure to intense combat varied by unit. Interviews with numerous combat controllers suggest that this was a rarity. Key battles at Konduz and Mazar-e-Sharif, for example, featured little to no close combat. Airpower routed an attacking column at Tarin Kowt, killing 300 Taliban according to the captured commander, and required no close combat.
127. Secretary of State Powell warned in December 2001 that the Afghan model would not work in Iraq: "They're two different countries with two different regimes, two different military capabilities.... They are so significantly different that you can't take the Afghan model and immediately apply it to Iraq." Quoted in Schmitt and Dao, "Use of Air Power Comes of Age in New War." Milan Vego, writing in July 2002, asserted, "In short, the use of airpower in combination with special forces on the ground can be expected to be successful in some counterterrorist operation or campaign in the future, but not in major regional contingencies." Vego, "What Can We Learn from Enduring Freedom?" Events in Iraq would prove both men wrong.
128. For descriptions of the roles SOF played in western and southern Iraq, see Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004).
129. A special forces ODA Team normally consists of twelve personnel.
130. The Green Line was a de facto border within Iraq that roughly separated Kurdish and Iraqi territory.
131. The teams had three primary missions: first, harass the thirteen Iraqi divisions on the Green Line; second, destroy camps in northern Iraq belonging to the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group; and third, capture key oil fields near Kirkuk and stabilize the northern cities of Mosul and Kirkuk. Williamson Murray and Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales Jr., The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2003), pp. 69-70, 186-190.
132. Clearly, the Iraqis outnumbered the Kurds, but reliable estimates of the ratio during the war are unavailable. Often, the number of Peshmerga who reported for battle varied widely from the promises of militia leaders. Exact figures are elusive. See Aysla Aydintasbas, "The Kurdish Dilemma," Salon.com, September 6, 2002;
133. and "Kurdish Resistance Forces Must Decide Role in New Iraq," Washington Post, May 13, 2003.
134. ODA Team 391 and 392, for instance, were expecting 200 Kurds for an operation, and approximately 80 showed up. See Sean D. Naylor, "Nightmare at Debecka," Army Times, September 29, 2003, http://www.armytimes.com/ story.php?f-1-292925-2230402.php.
135. Capt. Joseph Swiecki, correspondence with authors, February 17, 2004.
136. Naylor, "Nightmare at Debecka."
137. Capt. Eric Carver, U.S. Army, commander, ODA 065, memorandum for record, subject: Historical Documentation of ODA 065 Operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom, April 16, 2003, available from the U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned.
138. Ibid. A battalion-sized element comprises approximately 1,000 troops.
139. Baath Party enforcers often inspired enemy motivation. At the battle of Debecka Pass, Iraqis attempting to surrender were summarily executed. Sgt. 1st Class Frank Antenori, interview, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, February 18, 2004. See also Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, p. 189.
140. Swiecki, correspondence with authors.
141. Antenori, interview.
142. The Iraqis parked their armor next to an elevated roadway, leaving only the top of the tanks visible to the special forces teams. Unfortunately, ground-directed laser energy passed over the turrets due to the "graze" angle generated by a combination of Iraqi placement and friendly troop position. As a result, the laser "spot" impacted the ground well beyond the target. The laser-guided bombs functioned properly, but because the laser was not reflecting on the targets, the tanks survived.
143. Naylor, "Nightmare at Debecka."
144. Antenori, interview.
145. Swiecki, correspondence with authors.
146. Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare, p. 43.
147. In Military Power, Biddle presents the theoretical underpinnings of this argument.
148. O'Hanlon, "A Flawed Masterpiece."
149. Smucker, Al Qaeda's Great Escape.
150. See also Arostegui, "The Search for bin Laden";
151. Biddle, Special Forces and the Future of Warfare;
152. Donnelly, "Fighting Terror/The Military Campaign";
153. Glasser, "The Battle of Tora Bora";
154. and O'Hanlon, "A Flawed Masterpiece."
155. Smucker, Al Qaeda's Great Escape;
156. and Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: Berkley, 2005), p. 19.
157. Bonin, The First Year, p. 34;
158. and Richard Stewart, "The U.S. Army in Afghanistan: October 2001-March 2002," U.S. Army Center for Military History pamphlet, June 24, 2004, p. 24.
159. Before he was assassinated by al-Qaida, Massoud, the former leader of the Northern Alliance, related that he had never managed to capture any of its members because they would commit suicide when facing imminent capture. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 52.
160. Lt. Col. Christopher Haas, U.S. Army Special Forces adviser to the Afghans, personal correspondence, February 18, 2004. Another adviser called it "the most formidable terrain that we fought in."
161. Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, p. 19.
162. Stewart, "The U.S. Army in Afghanistan," p. 24.
163. U.S. Marines had established a small forward base near Kandahar, and only a reinforced company of the Tenth Mountain Division was available at Bagram and Mazar-e-Sharif.
164. See ibid.
165. Quoted in Glasser, "The Battle of Tora Bora."
166. Glasser, "The Battle of Tora Bora." Ibid.
167. "Hazrat Ali is very opportunistic, taking money from our side, and also the al-Qaida folks," according to an unnamed Western diplomat, quoted in Glasser, "The Battle of Tora Bora." ibid.
168. Donnelly, "Fighting Terror/The Military Campaign."
169. Stewart, "The U.S. Army in Afghanistan," p. 26.
170. Quoted in Arostegui, "The Search for bin Laden."
171. Bruce Pirnie, RAND analyst, interview, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, October 22, 2003.
172. Donnelly, "Fighting Terror/The Military Campaign."
173. Lt. Col. Christopher Haas and Col. Mark Rosengard confirmed this observation.
174. Haas, personal correspondence;
175. Rosengard, interview;
176. and Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, p. 19.
177. Haas, personal correspondence.
178. Donnelly, "Fighting Terror/The Military Campaign."
179. Lieutenant Colonel Haas relates that the enormity of the task presented a logistical and tactical problem that the marines were unwilling to tackle at this stage of the war. Haas, personal correspondence.
180. Stephen Biddle, "Why the Taliban Fell," PowerPoint briefing, June 6, 2002, slide 13.
181. Quoted in Finlan, "Warfare by Other Means," p. 102.
182. Rosengard, interview;
183. and Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, p. 19.
184. Lieutenant Colonel Haas adds, "Even our best [infantry divisions] would have had serious, serious difficulties in this area."
185. Haas, personal correspondence.
186. Haas, personal correspondence.
187. Quoted in Donnelly, "Fighting Terror/The Military Campaign." Lieutenant Colonel Haas notes that Ali's main motivation came from money, television coverage, and the prestige associated with U.S. support.
188. Haas, personal correspondence.
189. Hastert, "Operation Anaconda," pp. 13-14.
190. There are few examples of enemy leaders being captured during war. The preeminent one is probably Napoleon III, who was captured at Sedan during the Franco-Prussian War. A number of variables contribute to the likelihood of a leader being captured, including terrain, friendly local population, and the absence of friendly forces in the area. At Tora Bora, such factors strongly favored the escape of al-Qaida leaders. Both Lieutenant Colonel Haas and Colonel Rosengard assert that U.S. Army planners were unsurprised by the Afghans' failure at Tora Bora. Rosengard notes, "Just the fact that he [Ali] got us to that piece of ground was a success."
191. Haas, personal correspondence;
192. and Rosengard, interview.
193. Lt. Gen. Franklin Hagenbeck, Joint Task Force commander, Operation Enduring Freedom, interview by Maj. Mark Davis, Washington, D.C., January 28, 2004.
194. U.S. forces were chosen for the "anvil" role specifically because it was believed they had the skill to perform the job and because it was feared that, in a repeat of Tora Bora, Afghans could be bribed to allow the enemy to escape. Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, pp. 118-120.
195. For a description of the problems, see Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Office of Air Force Lessons Learned, United States Air Force Headquarters Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective, 2005.
196. "Operation Anaconda Case Study" (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, 2003), p. 26;
197. and Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, pp. 184-189, 197-206. Although not known at the time, the Afghan force also suffered "friendly fire" from an AC-130 on the scene.
198. Eight U.S. troops died in action during Operation Anaconda. Interestingly, they were part of a separate operation outside the direct control of the main U.S. commander, then Maj. Gen. Hagenbeck. Hastert, "Operation Anaconda," pp. 15-18.
199. U.S. Air Force intelligence estimates placed the number of fighters in the valley at 1,500. The U.S. Army claims some 500 enemy combatants were killed in Operation Anaconda. Naylor puts the enemy losses at 150-300. Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, pp. 375-376.
200. According to U.S. Army Col. David Gray, one of Operation Anaconda's key planners, the United States chose to use the Afghan force in this situation for three reasons: (1) to appear different from previous Soviet incursions into the area, (2) to project the notion that the United States was "helping the Afghans help themselves," and (3) to be able to rely on the Afghans to perform the difficult task of separating enemy combatants from civilians in the villages. For more on the reasons the air force was not included in the planning process, see Elaine Grossman, "Was Operation Anaconda Ill-Fated From Start? Army Analyst Blames Afghan Battle Failings On Bad Command Set-Up," Inside the Pentagon, July 29, 2004.
201. Rosengard, interview.
202. An acrimonious debate persists over why the air force was not fully included in the planning for Anaconda. For a discussion of this debate, see Mark Davis, "Operation Anaconda: Command and Confusion in Joint Warfare," master's thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 2004.
203. Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, pp. 144-145.
204. Rosengard, interview.
205. Ibid.;
206. and Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die, pp. 144-145.
207. See, for instance, Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977);
208. Zeev Maoz, "Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1983), pp. 195-230;
209. and Russell J. Leng, Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816-1980: Realism versus Reciprocity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
210. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 43. For an earlier analysis of the requirements for this mission,
211. see Benjamin and Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, p. 295.
212. Swiecki, correspondence with authors.
213. For the use of SOF-heavy methods without indigenous allies, see Robinson, Masters of Chaos, chap. 9.
214. For an elegant exposition of this argument, see Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002).
215. Benjamin and Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 294-295.
216. The insurgency in Iraq as well as the United States' experience in the Vietnam War and the Soviet Union's in the Afghan War highlight the vulnerability of great powers to guerrilla warfare.
217. See Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Fort Bragg, N.C.: Army Special Warfare School, 1989), chap. 6.
218. "Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations," FM 31-21 Department of the Army Field Manual (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958).
219. Throughout the campaign, the fear of civil war between these factions was a major consideration in NSC planning. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 187.
220. Peter Beaumont et al., "The Rout of the Taliban."
221. See also Woodward, Bush at War, p. 187.
222. See Babak Dehghanpisheh, "Now We Have America," Newsweek, April 7, 2003, p. 35.
223. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, The United States and Coercive. Diplomacy (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), chap. 9.
224. See Zimmerman, "Strategic Provocation," p. 49.
225. Khatami declared, "The possibility of a U.S. attack against Iran is very low. We think America is not in a position to take a lunatic action of attacking Iran.... The U.S. is deeply engaged in Iraq."
226. Quoted in CBS News, "Iran to U.S.: We're Ready," January 20, 2005, http://cbsnews.cbs.com.
227. Biddle, "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare," p. 49.