Governmental action, social norms, and criminal behavior

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 161, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 522-535

  Funk, Patricia ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 26644459995     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/093245605774259363     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. AKERLOF, G. A., AND W. T. DICKENS [1982], "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review, 72, 307-319.
2. ANDREONI, J. [1991], "Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?" RAND Journal of Economics, 22, 385-395.
3. BAR-GILL, O., AND A. HAREL [2001], "Crime Rates and Expected Sanctions: The Economics of Deterrence Revisited," Journal of Legal Studies, 30, 485-501.
4. BECKER, G. [1968], "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, 76, 169-217.
5. CIALDINI, R. B. [1993], Influence - Science and Practice, Harper Collins College Publishers: New York.
6. COLEMAN, J. S. [1990], Foundations of Social Theory, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.
7. COOTER, R. [1998], "Expressive Law and Economics," Journal of Legal Studies, 27, 585-608.
8. _ [2000], "Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms," Virginia Law Review, 86, 1577-1601.
9. COTTON, J. L. [1985], "Cognitive Dissonance in Selective Exposure," pp. 11-33 in: D. Zillmann and B. Jennings (eds.), Selective Exposure to Communication, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Hillsdale, NJ, London.
10. ELLICKSON, R. C. [1998], "Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms," Journal of Legal Studies, 21, 537-552.
11. ELSTER, J. [1989], "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3, 99-117.
12. FALK, A., E. FEHR, AND U. FISCHBACHER [2000], "Informal Sanctions," University of Zurich Working Paper No. 59.
13. _ AND U. FISCHBACHER [2002], " 'Crime' in the Lab - Detecting Social Interaction," European Economic Review, 46, 859-869.
14. FIGLIO, R. M. [1975], "The Seriousness of Offenses: An Evaluation by Offenders and Nonoffenders," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 66, 189-200.
15. FULLER, R. G. C., AND A. SHEEHY-SKEFFINGTON [1974], "Effects of Group Laughter on Responses to Humorous Materials: A Replication and Extension," Psychological Reports, 35, 531-534.
16. GAROUPA, N. [1997], "The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, 11, 267-295.
17. _ [2003], "Behavioral Economic Analysis of Crime: A Critical Review," European Journal of Law and Economics, 15, 5-15.
18. GLAESER, E., B. SACERDOTE, AND J. SCHEINKMAN [1996], "Crime and Social Interactions," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, 507-548.
19. GRASMICK, H. G., AND D. E. GREEN [1980], "Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 71, 325-335.
20. KAHAN, D. M. [2000], "Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem," University of Chicago Law Review, 67, 607-645.
21. KURAN, T. [1995], Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.
22. LAFREE, G. [1998], "Social Institutions and the Crime 'Bust' of the 1990s," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 88, 1325-1368.
23. LESSIG, L. [1998], "The New Chicago School," Journal of Legal Studies, 27, 661-691.
24. LEVI, M., AND S. JONES [1985], "Public and Police Perceptions of Crime Seriousness in England and Wales," British Journal of Criminology, 25, 234-250.
25. LIEBERT, R., AND R. A. BARON [1972], "Some Immediate Effects of Televised Violence in Children's Behavior," Developmental Psychology, 6, 469-475.
26. LINDBECK, A. [1995], "Welfare State Disincentives with Endogenous Preferences," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97, 477-494.
27. _, S. NYBERG, AND J. WEIBULL [1999], "Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 1-35.
28. LOTT, J. [1990], "The Effect of Conviction on the Legitimate Income of Criminals," Economics Letters, 34, 381-385.
29. _ [1992], "Do we Punish High-Income Criminals Too Heavily?" Economic Inquiry, 30, 583-608.
30. MCADAMS, R. H. [1997], "The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms," Michigan Law Review, 96, 338-433.
31. MEIER, R. F., AND W. JOHNSON [1977], "Deterrence as Social Control: The Legal and Extralegal Production of Conformity," American Sociological Review, 42, 292-304.
32. MILLER, D. T. [1976], "Ego Involvement and Attributions to Success and Failure," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 901-906.
33. MONTGOMERY, J. D. [1994], "Revisiting Tally's Corner: Mainstream Norms, Cognitive Dissonance and Underclass Behavior," Rationality and Society, 6, 462-488.
34. MORGAN, R. B. [1993], "Self- and Co-Worker Perceptions of Ethics and their Relations to Leadership and Salary," Academy of Management Journal, 36, 200-214.
35. OSTROM, E. [1998], "A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action," American Political Science Review, 92, 1-22.
36. PATERNOSTER, R. [1989], "Decisions to Participate in and Desist from Four Types of Common Delinquency: Deterrence and the Rational Choice Perspective," Law & Society Review, 23, 7-10.
37. POLINSKY, A. M., AND S. SHAVELL [2000], "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 45-76.
38. POSNER, E. A. [2000], Law and Social Norms, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.
39. POSNER, R. A., AND E. RASMUSEN [1999], "Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions," International Review of Law and Economics, 19, 369-382.
40. RABIN, M. [1994], "Cognitive Dissonance and Social Change," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 23, 177-194.
41. _ [1995], "Moral Preferences, Moral Constraints and Self-Serving Biases," Berkeley Department of Economics Working Paper.
42. RASMUSEN, E. [1996], "Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality," Journal of Law and Economics, 39, 519-543.
43. SAH, R. K. [1991], "Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime," Journal of Political Economy, 99, 1272-1295.
44. SCHRAG, J., AND S. SCOTCHMER [1997], "The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Crime," International Review of Law and Economics, 17, 325-335.
45. SHERMAN, L. W. [1993], "Defiance, Deterrence and Irrelevance: A Theory of Criminal Sanction," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 30, 445-473.
46. SMYTH, M. M., AND R. G. C. FULLER [1972], "Effects of Group Laughter on Responses to Humorous Materials," Psychological Reports, 30, 132-134.
47. SUNSTEIN, C. [1997], Free Markets and Social Justice, Oxford University Press: New York, Oxford.
48. SVENSON, O. [1981], "Are we Less Skillful than our Fellow Drivers Are?" Acta Psychologica, 47, 143-148.
49. TITTLE, C. R. [1980], Sanctions and Social Deviance, Praeger: New York.
50. TYLER, T. [1990], Why People Obey the Law, Yale University Press: New Haven, CT, London.
51. WALDFOGEL, J. [1994], "Does Conviction Have a Persistent Effect on Income and Employment?" International Review of Law and Economics, 14, 103-119.
52. WALKER, N., AND C. MARSH [1984], "Do Sentences Affect Public Disapproval?" British Journal of Criminology, 24, 27-48.