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Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 231-256

Caller number five and related timing games

Author keywords

Games of timing; Preemption game; War of attrition

Indexed keywords


EID: 49349098464     PISSN: None     EISSN: 15557561     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (28)

References (24)
  • 1
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    • Abreu, D.1    Brunnermeier, M.K.2
  • 3
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    • Unpublished paper, Department of Economics, University of Essex
    • Argenziano, Rossella and Philipp Schmidt-Dengler (2008), "N-player preemption games." Unpublished paper, Department of Economics, University of Essex. [235]
    • (2008) N-player preemption games , pp. 235
    • Argenziano, R.1    Schmidt-Dengler, P.2
  • 4
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    • Regulating a monopolist with unknown, costs
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    • (1982) Econometrica , vol.50 , Issue.911-930 , pp. 241
    • Baron, D.P.1    Myerson, R.B.2
  • 5
    • 0030305641 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Baye, Michael R., Dan Kovenock, and Casper G. de Vries (1996), The all-pay auction with complete information. Economic Theory, 8, 291-305. [251]
    • Baye, Michael R., Dan Kovenock, and Casper G. de Vries (1996), "The all-pay auction with complete information." Economic Theory, 8, 291-305. [251]
  • 7
    • 0008977837 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The generalized war of attrition
    • Bulow, Jeremy and Paul Klemperer (1999), "The generalized war of attrition." American Economic Review, 89, 175-189. [234]
    • (1999) American Economic Review , vol.89 , Issue.175-189 , pp. 234
    • Bulow, J.1    Klemperer, P.2
  • 8
    • 0001560563 scopus 로고
    • Preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology
    • Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole (1985), "Preemption and rent equalization in the adoption of new technology." Review of Economic Studies, 52, 383-401. [235]
    • (1985) Review of Economic Studies , vol.52 , Issue.383-401 , pp. 235
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Tirole, J.2
  • 9
    • 0000243008 scopus 로고
    • A theory of exit in duopoly
    • Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole (1986), "A theory of exit in duopoly." Econometrica, 54, 943-960. [234]
    • (1986) Econometrica , vol.54 , Issue.943-960 , pp. 234
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Tirole, J.2
  • 10
    • 0001466805 scopus 로고
    • Potential, value, and consistency
    • Hart, Sergiu and Andreu Mas-Colell (1989), "Potential, value, and consistency." Econometrica, 57, 589-614. [239]
    • (1989) Econometrica , vol.57 , Issue.589-614 , pp. 239
    • Hart, S.1    Mas-Colell, A.2
  • 11
    • 0001039264 scopus 로고
    • The war of attrition in continuous time with complete information
    • Hendricks, Ken, Andrew Weiss, and Charles A. Wilson (1988), "The war of attrition in continuous time with complete information." International Economic Review, 29, 663-680. [234]
    • (1988) International Economic Review , vol.29 , Issue.663-680 , pp. 234
    • Hendricks, K.1    Weiss, A.2    Wilson, C.A.3
  • 12
    • 0003762984 scopus 로고
    • Mathematical Methods and Theory in Games, Programming, and Economics
    • Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts
    • Karlin, Samuel (1959), Mathematical Methods and Theory in Games, Programming, and Economics, volume II: The Theory of Infinite Games. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts. [235]
    • (1959) The Theory of Infinite Games , vol.2 , pp. 235
    • Karlin, S.1
  • 13
    • 12744277863 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Continuous-time games of timing
    • Laraki, Rida, Eilon Solan, and Nicolas Vieille (2005), "Continuous-time games of timing." Journal of Economic Theory, 120, 206-238. [235]
    • (2005) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.120 , Issue.206-238 , pp. 235
    • Laraki, R.1    Solan, E.2    Vieille, N.3
  • 14
    • 0242679597 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • To grab for the market or to bide one's time: A dynamic model of entry
    • Levin, Dan and James Peck (2003), "To grab for the market or to bide one's time: A dynamic model of entry." RAND Journal of Economics, 34, 536-556. [235]
    • (2003) RAND Journal of Economics , vol.34 , Issue.536-556 , pp. 235
    • Levin, D.1    Peck, J.2
  • 16
    • 0016295808 scopus 로고
    • The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts
    • Maynard Smith, John (1974), "The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts." Journal of Theoretical Biology, 47, 209-221. [234]
    • (1974) Journal of Theoretical Biology , vol.47 , Issue.209-221 , pp. 234
    • Maynard Smith, J.1
  • 17
    • 27744581012 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The expected number of Nash equilibria of a normal form game
    • McLennan, Andrew (2005), "The expected number of Nash equilibria of a normal form game." Econometrica, 73, 141-174. [245]
    • (2005) Econometrica , vol.73 , Issue.141-174 , pp. 245
    • McLennan, A.1
  • 22
    • 33744537763 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Volunteering for heterogeneous tasks
    • Sahuguet, Nicolas (2006), "Volunteering for heterogeneous tasks." Games and Economic Behavior, 56, 333-349. [235]
    • (2006) Games and Economic Behavior , vol.56 , Issue.333-349 , pp. 235
    • Sahuguet, N.1
  • 23
    • 0010138288 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Second mover disadvantages in a three-player Stackelberg game with private information
    • Shinkai, Tetsuya (2000), "Second mover disadvantages in a three-player Stackelberg game with private information." Journal of Economic Theory, 90, 293-304. [235]
    • (2000) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.90 , Issue.293-304 , pp. 235
    • Shinkai, T.1
  • 24
    • 49349114797 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • All-pay contests
    • Department of Economics, Northwestern University
    • Siegel, Ron (2007), "All-pay contests." Unpublished paper, Department of Economics, Northwestern University. [234]
    • (2007) Unpublished paper , pp. 234
    • Siegel, R.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.