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Volumn 90, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 293-304

Second Mover Disadvantages in a Three-Player Stackelberg Game with Private Information

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EID: 0010138288     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2608     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (23)

References (13)
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    • First-mover disadvantages with private information
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    • Reputation with Noisy Precommitment
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    • Coumot oligopoly with information sharing
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.