Continuous-time games of timing

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 120, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 206-238

  Laraki, Rida ^a   Solan, Eilon ^b,c   Vieille, Nicolas ^d  

^a ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE   (France)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^d HEC PARIS   (France)

Author keywords

Continuous time games; Games of timing; Preemption games; Timing games; War of attrition

Indexed keywords

EID: 12744277863     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001     Document Type: Article

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